"The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Germany" by Mary O'Sullivan
The  Political  Economy  of 
Corporate  Governance  in  Germany 
Mary  O’Sullivan* 
Working  Paper  No.  226 
February  1998 
*INSEAD  and  Center  for  Industrial  Competitiveness,  University  of  Massachusetts  Lowell 
The  research  for  this  paper  was  funded  by  a  grant  from  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute.  1 gratefully 
acknowledge  the  comments  of  Bill  Lazonick  and  the  research  assistance  of  Catherine  O’Sullivan. The  Political  Economy  of Corporate  Governance  in Germany’ 
Mary  O’Sullivan 
The  question  of how  corporate  enterprises  should  be  governed  to enhance  economic 
performance  is  one  that  has,  in  recent  years,  attracted  growing  attention  in 
Germany.  The  intensification  of international  competition,  especially  from  Japan,  has 
created  unprecedented  challenges  for  German  corporate  enterprises  and  has  led  to 
a questioning  of the  way  in which  corporate  resources  and  returns  are  allocated.  The 
extant  system  of  corporate  governance  in  Germany  is  also  under  pressure  from  the 
financial  sector  and,  in  particular,  from  changing  patterns  of  savings  and  pension 
provision. 
To  understand  the  potential  economic  implications  of challenges  from  the  real 
and  financial  sectors  for  the  system  of  corporate  governance  -  the  social  process 
that  shapes  who  makes  investment  decisions  in  corporations,  what  types  of 
investments  they  make,  and  how  the  returns  from  successful  investments  are 
distributed  -  we  need  an  economic  theory  of  governance.  In  previous  work,  I  have 
argued  that,  if  it  is  to  be  relevant,  a  theory  of  corporate  governance  must  take 
account  of  innovation,  that  is,  of the  process  through  which  productive  resources  are 
developed  and  utilised  to  generate  higher  quality  and/  or  lower  cost  products  than 
had  previously  been  available  (O’Sullivan  1997;  Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan,  1997a; 
1997b;  1997c;  O’Sullivan,  1996). 
Innovation  is  central  to  the  dynamic  through  which  successful  economies 
improve  their  performance  over  time  as  well  as  relative  to  each  other.  Historical 
research  on  innovation  in  all  of  the  advanced  industrial  nations  has  highlighted  the 
importance,  as  loci  of  innovation,  of  corporate  enterprises  that  compete  for  markets 
to  survive.  A  relevant  theory  of  corporate  resource  allocation  and  its  governance 
must  therefore  incorporate  an  understanding  of  the  central  characteristics  of  the 
innovation  process. 
On  the  basis  of  the  extensive  literature  on  the  subject,  innovation,  and  the 
learning  process  that  is  its  substance,  can  be  characterised  as  one  that  is  collective 
and  cumulative  and,  hence,  organisational.  A  system  of corporate  governance,  if it is 
to  support  innovation,  must  generate  the  social  conditions  that  permit  collective  and 
cumulative  learning  to  take  place.  Specifically,  it  must  provide  support  for  financial 
commitment  --  the  commitment  of  resources  to  irreversible  investments  with 
uncertain  returns  --  and  organisational  integration  --  the  integration  of  human  and 
physical  resources  into  an  organisational  process  to  develop  and  utilise  technology 
(Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan,  1996). 
Organisational  integration  describes  the  social  relations  that  provide 
participants  in  a  complex  division  of  labour  with  the  abilities  and  incentives  to 
integrate  their  capabilities  and  efforts  within  organisations  so  that,  potentially,  they 
can  generate  organisational  learning.  Financial  commitment  describes  the  social 
relations  that  are  the  basis  for  a  business  organisation’s  continuing  access  to  the 
financial  resources  required  for  sustaining  the  development  and  utilisation  of 
productive  resources.  Financial  commitment  and  organisational  integration  represent 
social  conditions  that  together  support  “organisational  control”  over  the  critical  inputs 
in  the  innovation  process:  knowledge  and  money.  By  contributing  to  the  innovation 
process,  however,  these  inputs  are  not  commodities  but  reflect  the  social  relations  to 
the  business  organisation  of those  who  supply  knowledge  and  money. 
’  Unless  otherwise  explicitly  stated,  Germany  is  used  herein  to  refer  to  the  former  Federal 
Republic  of Germany. 
1 Without  institutions  that  support  organisational  control,  business  enterprises 
cannot  generate  innovation  through  strategic  investment  in  collective  and  cumulative 
learning  processes.  Yet,  that  organisational  control  is  supported  by  social  institutions 
does  not  imply  that  innovation  will  in  fact  occur.  Innovation  is  defined  relative  to  the 
competitive  environment  in which  it occurs;  whether  certain  products  are  considered 
higher  quality  and/  or  lower  cost  depends  on  the  quality  and  cost  of  competitive 
offerings.  Since  the  competitive  context  varies  across  industry  as  well  as,  within 
industry,  over  time,  so  too  does  the  nature  of  the  innovation  process  and  the 
strategies  and  learning  that  comprise  it. 
As  a  result,  the  financial  and  organisational  requirements  of  the  innovation 
process  differ  across  industries  as  well  as,  with  economic  development,  over  time. 
Particular  social  conditions  that  in  one  time  and  place  support  successful  investment 
strategies  and  organisational  learning  processes  may  prove  unsuitable  as  a basis  for 
competition  as  the  investment  strategies  and  the  organisational  learning  processes 
that  generate  innovation  evolve.  To  understand  the  relationship  between  social 
institutions  and  innovation  we  must  therefore  analyse  the  interaction  of  the  social 
conditions  that  support  economic  development  with  the  dynamics  of competition. 
In  historical  perspective,  it  is  evident  that  governance  institutions  come  into 
existence  and  evolve  in  response  to  forces  that  are  closely  related  to  their  functional 
role  in the  productive  economy.  But  they  also  evolve  in  response  to  forces  that  have 
different  origins.  As  far  as  the  systems  of  corporate  governance  in  the  advanced 
industrial  economies  are  concerned,  a critical  source  of  institutional  change  in  recent 
decades  has  been  the  growth  of  intergenerational  dependence.  What  is  of 
importance  for  the  governance  system  is  not  the  demographic  phenomenon  of 
population  ageing  per  se  but  the  social  construction  of  the  ageing  process  as 
reflected  in the  structures  of working  lives  and  pension  systems. 
The  nature  of  the  dynamic  interaction  between  systems  of  governance  and 
evolving  challenges  in  the  real  and  financial  sectors  cannot  be  determined  in  the 
abstract.  Rather  it  must  be  studied  with  reference  to  evolving  historical  realities. 
Section  1 describes  the  system  of corporate  governance  that  was  put  in  place  in  the 
postwar  decades  in  the  former  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  In  Section  2  the 
relationship  between  these  corporate  governance  arrangements  and  economic 
performance  is  analysed.  Section  3 is concerned  with  the  challenges  for  the  German 
system  of  governance  that  emanate  from  the  real  and  financial  sectors  of  the 
economy.  In  Section  4 the  implications  of these  pressures  for  the  German  system  of 
corporate  governance  are  considered. 
1.  The  Foundations  of  Postwar  Governance 
From  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century,  the  competitive  success  of 
major  German  enterprises  was  built  on  a  system  that  integrated  the  knowledge  of 
managers  in  organisational  learning  processes.  Supporting  investments  in  the 
incentives  and  abilities  of  managers  was  the  evolution  of  a governance  system  that 
created  the  social  conditions  on  which  insiders  gained  control  over  the  allocation  of 
resources  and  returns  in  the  German  corporate  economy.  The  institutions  of worker 
apprenticeship  and  codetermination  have  roots  that  date  back  to the  medieval  guilds 
and  the  Bismarckian  era  respectively.  These  institutions  were  not,  however, 
systematically  integrated  in  the  prewar  German  system  of  governance, 
notwithstanding  attempts  to do  so  during  the  Weimar  period;  organisational  control  in 
Germany  before  the  war  was  essentially  managerial  control  (Lazonick  and 
O’Sullivan,  1997). 
2 Immediately  after  the  war,  in  reaction  to  the  abuse  of  concentrated  power  to 
which,  as  evidenced  during  the  Nazi  period,  managerial  control  could  lead,  there  was 
considerable  political  support  for  transforming  the  German  system  of  corporate 
governance.  With  Germany’s  defeat,  the  declared  intention  of the  Allied  Occupation 
forces,  particularly  the  Americans,  was  to  break  up  the  concentration  of  economic 
power  in  German  industry  and  banking  and  to  replace  it with  market  control.  But  the 
onset  of the  Cold  War,  and  the  perceived  importance  of the  West  German  economy 
as  a bulwark  against  the  power  of the  Soviets,  led  to  a decline  in the  commitment  to 
this  path. 
1.1  The Persistence  of financial  Commitment 
Despite  the  dissolution  of  industrial  trusts,  such  as  the  I.  G.  Farben  chemical 
combine,  the  constituent  companies  often  reemerged  as  dominant  autonomous 
enterprises  and  established  links  with  one  another.  Many  of  the  major  German 
industrial  enterprises  on  which  the  post-World  War  II German  economy  has  relied  to 
undertake  innovative  investment  strategies  are  those  that  became  dominant  before 
World  War  II  and  prime  vestiges  of  pre-World  War  II  managerial  control  --  namely, 
inter-company  shareholding  networks  and  bank-industry  relations  --  remained  strong 
in the  postwar  decades. 
In  general,  inter-company  links  remained  extremely  tight  in the  postwar  West 
German  economy;  in  1960  non-financial  enterprises  accounted  for  35.7  per  cent  of 
total  assets  held  in  West  Germany  in  the  form  of  shares,  making  them  by  far  the 
largest  stockholder  group  (Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994,  p.  182).  Although  strictly 
comparable  figures  are  not  available,  the  level  of  inter-company  stockholding  would 
seem  to  have  at  least  remained  steady  since  then;  in  1984  non-financial  enterprises 
held  36.1  per  cent  of  shares  issued  by  German  enterprises  (Ibid.,  p.  180).  Although 
much  less  important  as  a  stockholding  group  than  non-financial  enterprises,  banks 
and  insurance  companies  also  held  significant  equity  participations  in  German 
corporations  in  the  postwar  period.  Banks  accounted  for  between  7.6  per  cent  and 
10.3  percent  in  1984  (depending  on  whether  you  include  investment  funds  which  are, 
to  a large  extent,  owned  by the  banks)  of the  total  nominal  value  of shares  issued  by 
German  companies  (Ibid.,  p.  180). 
A  study  of  bank  holdings  in  74  large  West  German  enterprises  in  1974-5 
showed  that  Deutsche  Bank,  Dresdner  Bank  and  Commerzbank  together  accounted 
for  two-thirds  of  bank  participations,  and  were  thus  among  the  most  influential 
stockholders  in  the  West  German  economy  (Gessler  Commission,  1979,  p.  467). 
The  single  most  important  stockholder  in  Germany  is  not,  however,  a  bank  but  the 
country’s  largest  insurance  company,  Allianz  AG.  Insurance  companies  as  a  group 
account  for  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  the  shares  of  German  enterprises,  but 
Allianz  appears  in  many  of  the  inter-company  shareholding  networks  that  span 
German  industry  (Owen  Smith,  1994,  p.  338)  and  for  this  reason  is  often  referred  to 
as  “the  spider  in the  web”. 
The  importance  of  inter-company  shareholding  is  the  source  of  the 
substantial  difference  between  patterns  of  direct  and  ultimate  shareholding  in  the 
German  corporate  economy.  In  1973  more  than  70  per  cent  of  the  market  value  of 
the  equity  capital  of  listed  AGs  was  accounted  for  by  companies  in  which  the  share 
of the  largest  shareholder  was  at  least  25  per  cent  (Iber,  1985,  p.  1111).  A  study  of 
the  300  largest  German  industrial  enterprises  in  1972  showed  that,  classified  in 
terms  of direct  ownership,  “owner-controlled”  companies  accounted  for  75.1  per  cent 
of  the  sample’s  aggregate  turnover;  in  contrast,  when  categorised  in  terms  of 
ultimate  ownership,  manager-controlled  firms  accounted  for  the  majority  of  total 
3 turnover  (64.6  per  cent)  and  owner-controlled  firms  for  35.4  per  cent  (Schreyogg  and 
Steinmann,  1981,  pp.  533-556). 
The  gap  between  direct  and  ultimate  ownership  largely  stems  from  the  fact 
that  the  companies  that  represent  the  most  important  nodes  in  inter-company 
shareholding  networks  are  among  the  most  widely  held  in  Germany.  But  even  these 
companies  have,  in  the  postwar  period,  been  insulated  from  market  control.  More 
than  75  per  cent  of the  value  of domestic  shares  in  Germany  are  held  on  deposit  by 
the  private  banking  sector  and  the  vast  majority  of  these  shares  are  deposited  with 
the  Big  Three  (Owen  Smith,  1994,  p.  359).  They  exercise  proxy  voting  rights  for 
these  shares,  subject  to  certain  requirements  for  stockholder  approval.  The 
Monopo/kommission  concluded  from  an  analysis  of  the  equity  votes  represented  at 
general  meetings  of  stockholders  in  1974  that  banks  controlled  an  average  of  56.7 
percent  of  the  total  votes.  Only  7  percent  came  from  the  banks’  own  stockholdings 
and  an  enormous  49.5  percent  was  based  on  the  proxy  votes  that  they  exercised  on 
behalf  of  their  depositors  (Monopolkommission,  1978,  p.  199).  The  importance  of 
proxies  was  greater  for  the  largest  AGs;  in the  ten  largest  AGs  by turnover  the  banks 
controlled  a total  of 67  per  cent  of the  votes  compared  with  42.6  per  cent  in the  AGs 
ranked  from  51 to  100  (Ibid.). 
It is their  role  as  depositories  of the  shares  of diffusely-held  companies  that  is 
the  greatest  source  of  potential  influence  by  the  banks  on  the  German  corporate 
economy.  It  gives  them  a  significant  voice  at  shareholder  meetings  and,  since 
shareholders’  representatives  on  supervisory  boards  are  elected  at  the  annual 
general  meeting,  on  the  composition  of supervisory  boards,  In a study  of supervisory 
board  representation,  the  German  Monopo/kommission  found  that  banks  were 
directly  represented  on  the  supervisory  boards  of 75  of the  largest  100  AGs  in  1974, 
with  179  seats  in total  being  occupied  by the  banks,  102  by the  Big  Banks  and  55  by 
Deutsche  Bank  alone  (Monopolkommission).  Yet  based  on  their  analysis  of  bank 
representation  on  supervisory  boards  of  AGs  with  more  than  2,000  employees  in 
1979,  Gerum,  Steinmann  and  Fees  concluded  that  banks  could  not  control  decision 
making  on  the  supervisory  board  even  if  they  acted  in  concert  because  they  only 
occupied  16.4  per  cent  of shareholder  seats  on  average  and  8.2  per  cent  of the  total 
number  of  supervisory  board  seats.  They  also  found,  based  on  their  study  of  these 
companies’  articles  of  incorporation,  that  in  only  20  percent  of  these  cases  was 
supervisory  board  consent  required  for  the  enterprise’s  general  product  or  market 
strategy;  in  only  10  percent  was  such  consent  needed  for  general  business  plans  or 
investment  finance  plans  (Gerum,  Steinmann  and  Fees,  1988,  p.  74).  Members  of 
the  supervisory  board  tended  to  meet  infrequently;  for  86  percent  of  the  AGs 
surveyed  their  supervisory  boards  met  only  twice  a  year  (Ibid.,  p.  108).  With  some 
exceptions,  the  Vorstand  (management  board)  rather  than  the  Aufsichtsrat 
(supervisory  board)  is  the  main  decision-making  body  of  the  German  AG  and  its 
members  are  salaried  managers  who,  in the  postwar  decades,  generally  have  been 
promoted  up  through  the  enterprise  (Lawrence,  1984,  p.  36).  For  all  of  these 
reasons,  members  of  the  supervisory  boards  --  bankers  or  otherwise  --  were  highly 
dependent  on  insiders  for  their  understanding  of the  business. 
The  relationship  of  the  Big  Banks  to  the  allocation  of  corporate  resources  in  the 
FRG  has  been  the  subject  of  ongoing  controversy,  as  it  was  prior  to  and  during 
World  War  2. These  banks  have  perhaps  most  often  been  portrayed  as  controllers  of 
West  German  industry.  Yet  the  available  evidence  shows  that  the  banks  appear  to 
have  acquiesced  in  a  postwar  system  of  governance  that  bolstered  managerial 
control.  In the  highly  regulated  financial  system  that  was  put  in  place  in the  FRG  and 
in  which,  through  the  regulation  of  banking  competition,  the  Big  Banks  were 
accorded  the  scope  to  develop  strong  positions  in  a  number  of  attractive  market 
4 segments,  they  had  stronger  incentives  to  support  organisational  control  in  the 
corporate  economy  than  to  confront  it.  They  had  a  significant  interest  in  the 
continued  success  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany’s  leading  industrial 
enterprises  since  these  companies  represented  a  lucrative  source  of  revenues  for 
their  short-term  lending,  export  financing,  and  corporate  financial  services 
businesses  (Gall  et  al,  1995,  p.  610-56).  Bank  control  over  corporate  resource 
allocation,  and  certainly  its  uncontested  exercise,  also  seems  implausible  because  of 
the  banks’  limited  ability  to  exercise  it.  As  I have  already  observed,  there  were  real 
limitations  to  the  exercise  of  bank  power  through  their  direct  shareholding,  proxy 
votes,  and  supervisory  board  seats.  Moreover,  the  access  of  the  major  industrial 
enterprises  to  internally  generated  funds  rendered  most  of  them  relatively 
independent  of  external  sources  of  finance  (Dyson,  1986;  Esser,  1990,  pp.  17-32; 
Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994,  pp.  228-240). 
As  had  been  the  case  before  the  war,  so  in  its  aftermath,  internal  funds  soon 
became  the  predominant  source  of  investment  finance  for  major  German  industrial 
enterprises  (Wallich,  1955,  p.  166).  Indeed,  the  importance  of  retained  earnings  in 
financing  German  industrial  reconstruction  created  considerable  concern  about  the 
concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of the  propertied  classes  (Roskamp,  1965).  As 
early  as  the  1950s  internally-generated  funds  were  by far  the  most  important  sources 
of  finance  for  German  enterprises,  funding  more  than  75  percent  of  net  investment. 
The  banks,  focussed  on  the  reconstruction  of  their  own  organisations  and  asset 
bases,  had  only  limited  funds  to  lend,  and  these  tended  to  be  provided  in the  form  of 
short-term  loans.  Sometimes  these  funds  were  used  by  companies  for  long-term 
purposes  but  the  banks  attempted  to  limit  this  behavior  to  control  their  maturity  risk. 
To  the  extent  that  long-term  funds  were  provided  by  the  banking  system,  they  were 
ultimately  funded  from  the  Marshall  Counterpart  Fund  and  channelled  to  the  banks 
by  the  Kreditanstalt  ftir  Wiederaufbau  (Reconstruction  Loan  Corporation)  (Shonfield, 
1965,  p.  276).  The  banks  bore  the  credit  risks  of  the  loans  that  they  made  out  of 
these  monies  --  loans  that  were  primarily  directed  toward  bottleneck  investments  in 
the  economy  (Shonfield,  1965,  p. 279;  Abelshauser,  1982,  pp.  34-53). 
As  Table  1  shows,  the  importance  of  internal  sources  of  investment  finance 
persisted  throughout  the  entire  period  from  1950  to  1989.  Even  after  the  reopening 
of  capital  markets  in  1956,  to  the  extent  that  large  German  companies  have  sought 
access  to  external  finance,  bank  loans  have  been  the  preferred  source  rather  than 
equity  or  bond  issues;  long-term  debt  accounted  for  12.1  percent  of the  net  sources 
of  investment  finance  and  equity  issues  for  a  tiny  1.5  per  cent  (for  an  extended 
discussion,  see  Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994,  pp.  49-70).  In  major  industrial 
enterprises  internally  generated  funds  were  even  more  important  as  a  source  of 
finance  for  investment  than  for  producing  enterprises  in  general;  internal  funds 
accounted  for  88.1  per  cent  of  the  net  sources  of  finance  for  investment  by  large 
manufacturing  AGs  compared  with  72.7  per  cent  for  producing  enterprises  for  the 
period  from  1971  to  1985  and  long-term  loans  were  1.7  per  cent  and  14.4  per  cent 
respectively  (Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994,  p.  127).  In  international  comparison 
German  enterprises  --  large  firms  as  well  as  the  producing  sector  as  a whole  --  are 
as  reliant,  and  if  anything  more  reliant,  on  internal  funds  as  a  source  of  investment 
finance  than  their  counterparts  in  other  advanced  industrial  economies  (Mayer  and 
Alexander,  1990,  pp.  450-475;  Hall,  1994,  pp.  110-143;  Corbett.  1996,  pp.  71-96). 
5 Table  1 Net  Sources  of investment  for  German  Producing  Enterprises,  1950-I  989, 
% 
1950-I  989  1950-I  959  1960-I  969  1970-l  979  1980-I  989 
Internally-generated  funds  75.4  75.4  74.1  71.3  80.1 
Provisions  for pensions  by  3.7  3.2  2.0  4.3  4.9 
enterprises 
Capital  transfers  from  5.5  1.2  4.0  7.9  9.0 
government 
Bank  borrowing  of which  11.7  11.8  13.4  12.0  10.2 
Long-term  12.1  9.0  11.5  15.6  12.6 
Short-term  -0.4  2.8  19  -3.7  -0.4 
Funds  from  insurance  0.5  1.2  0.9  0.5  -0.4 
enterprises 
Bonds  0.5  2.3  0.7  -0.4  -0.7 
Shares  1.5  1.9  2.4  0.6  1.1 
Other  of which  1.2  3.0  2.6  3.9  -4.1 
Foreign  trade  credit  -1.2  0.0  -1.1  -1.5  -2.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994,  p. 54. 
1.2  Contesting  Managerial  Control:  The  /&it&ion  of Codetermination 
Managerial  control  in  the  prewar  period  was  supported  by  company  law  and  in 
particular  by  the  institution  of the  two-tier  board  structure  which  dates  back  to  1870. 
The  supervisory  board  was  initially  intended  as  “a  substitute  for  the  state  charter  and 
the  continuous  state  control  which  were  abolished.  This  is  the  historical  reason  why 
the  Aufsichtsrat  is an  outside  board,  i.e.  it links  people  other  than  the  owners  with  the 
enterprise.  It  performs  functions  not  unlike  those  historically  intended  for  the 
disclosure  requirements  in  Britain  (Hopt,  1997,  p. 6,  emphasis  added;  see  also  Hopt 
1979)“.  In  practice  the  supervisory  board  did  not  perform  as  intended  and  the  1884 
corporate  law  reform  attempted  to  improve  its  functioning  by,  for  example, 
strengthening  its  rights  to  information.  Nevertheless,  it was  never  intended  that  the 
supervisory  board  would  actually  control  managers,  notwithstanding  the  impression 
given  by  those  who  have  tried  to  understand  its  governance  role  through  the  lens  of 
agency  theory  (for  a  discussion,  see  Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994).  The  new  legal 
framework  of the  FRG  preserved  the  main  features  of company  law  that  ensured  the 
subservience  of  the  individual  shareholder  to  the  business  organisation  (Raiser, 
1988).  As  Thomas  Raiser  put  it: 
[ulnder  German  law,  in  the  public  company  the  power  of  the  managing  board  is  rather 
strong,  because  Article  76  rules  directors  to  guide  the  company  under  their  own 
responsibility,  free  from  any  binding  instructions  of  either  shareholders  or  supervisory  board. 
Only  fundamental  changes  require  appro\.al  of  the  shareholder  meetins.  and  the  surpervisor>, 
board  may  esercise  a  veto  in  certain  cases  where  the  b>.-laws  provide  such  a  veto.  This 
widely  discretionary  power  of  the  managing  board  fax,ors  a  bias  towards  managerial 
‘absolutism’  which  sometimes  hardly  can  be stopped  (Raiser.  1993.  p. 37). 
The  institution  of codetermination  has,  however,  been  central  to a shift  away  from 
managerial  control  toward  a  contested  form  of  organisational  control.  The  onset  of 
the  Cold  War  led  the  US  military  government,  with  the  cooperation  of  the  newly 
installed  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (FRG)  government,  to  block  the  more 
ambitious  plans  for  integrating  workers  into  the  governance  of  industrial  enterprises. 
The  West  German  movement  for  industrial  democracy  thus  fell  short  of its  ambitions. 
Nevertheless,  the  postwar  institution  of codetermination  (Mitbestimmung)  did  extend 
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FRG  the  most  extensive  formal  system  of employee  representation  in the  world. 
Codetermination  is  comprised  of two  key  elements:  employee  representation  on 
the  supervisory  boards  of  corporate  enterprises  and  on  works  councils  that  operate 
at  plant  level.  Passed  only  under  the  threat  of  a  major  strike,  the  Codetermination 
Act  of  1951  mandated  parity  worker  representation  on  the  supervisory  boards  of 
enterprises  in  the  coal,  iron,  and  steel  industries  (Montanmifbestimmungl.  It  also 
provided  that  the  labour  director  in  these  companies  --  a  member  of  the 
management  board  --  could  not  be  appointed  against  the  wishes  of  the  worker 
representatives.  In  other  industries,  workers  were  denied  equal  representation; 
enterprises  with  more  than  500  employees  were  obligated  by the  Works  Constitution 
Act  of  1952  (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)  to  reserve  only  one-third  of the  supervisory 
board  seats  for  employee  representatives.  The  Codetermination  Act  of  1976, 
however,  mandated  that  all  companies  with  more  than  2,000  employees  increase 
employee  representation  on  their  supervisory  boards  from  one-third  to  one-half  of 
the  seats.  The  chairman  of  the  board  was  required  by  law  to  be  a  shareholder 
representative.  In  the  event  of  a tied  vote  he  was  granted  a  double  vote.  Thus  the 
law  firmly  tilted  the  balance  of  control  of  the  supervisory  board  against  employees. 
Companies  with  more  than  500  and  less  than  2000  employees  continued  to  allocate 
one-third  of  their  supervisory  board  seats  to  worker  representatives  (Streeck,  1984, 
pp.  391-422;  Raiser,  1988,  pp.  111-129). 
The  control  over  resources  that  labour  representatives  exercise  through  their 
participation  on  supervisory  boards  is  limited  by  the  restricted  role  that  the  board  as 
a  whole  plays  in  corporate  decision  making.  Indeed,  there  have  been  suggestions 
that  employers  have  limited  the  powers  of the  Aufsichtsrat  as  a whole  with  a view  to 
further  controlling  the  influence  of employees  (Gerum,  Steinmann,  and  Fees,  1988). 
Certainly,  many  German  employers  were  hostile  to  the  Codetermination  Act  of  1976 
and  they  challenged  it  in  the  Federal  Constitutional  Court  on  the  grounds  that  it 
violated  private  property  rights  (Raiser,  1988;  Thimm,  1981,  pp.  13-22).  The 
employers’  case  was,  however,  overturned. 
The  formation  of  works  councils  (Betriebsrate)  --  the  second  instrument  of 
employee  influence  over  corporate  decision  making  --  was  mandated  by  the  Works 
Constitution  Act  of  1952.  These  councils  are  elected  by  all  blue-collar  and  white- 
collar  workers  in  a  plant  and  are  designed  to  give  labour  the  right  to  participate  in 
and  receive  information  about  the  management  of  the  shop  floor.  Under  the  1952 
Act,  works  councils  have  important  codetermination  rights  over  issues  such  as 
working  hours,  piecework  rates  and  bonuses,  working  conditions,  as  well  as 
transfers  and  dismissals.  The  act  also  gives  works  councils  rights  to  information 
about  personnel  planning,  financial  matters,  and  major  strategic  changes.  Works 
councils’  codetermination  rights  are  thus  strong  with  respect  to  social  and  personnel 
matters  but  weak  in  relation  to  financial  and  strategic  issues  (Muller-Jentsch  1986, 
1995). 
In contrast  to  the  codetermination  of supervisory  boards,  the  works  councils  were 
a  conservative  initiative,  designed  to  some  extent  to  curb  the  excesses  of 
unaccountable  managerial  control.  But,  in  being  granted  exclusive  domain  over 
labour  representation  at  the  plant  level,  works  councils  were  made  formally 
independent  of  the  unions.  Intended  to  serve  as  a  counterweight  to  the  political 
power  of  the  unions,  the  role  of works  councils  was  to  cooperate  with  management 
for  “the  benefit  of the  employees  and  of the  establishment”.  Fearing  that  they  would 
transform  labour  representation  in  the  FRG  into  a  system  of  “yellow”  or  enterprise 
unions  that  would  ultimately  undermine  labour’s  political  power,  German  unions 
stridently  opposed  the  introduction  of  works  councils  (Markovits,  1986;  Muller- 
7 Jentsch,  1995).  What  transpired  in  fact  was  that,  notwithstanding  their  initial 
objections,  the  unions  established  close  links  to  works  councils  so  that  by  the  early 
1970s  more  than  80  per  cent  of  works  councillors  in  the  FRG  were  union 
representatives  (Thelen,  1991,  p. 80;  Muller-Jentsch,  1995). 
Through  works  councils,  worker  representatives  arguably  exercise  more 
influence  over  the  allocation  of  enterprise  resources  and  returns  than  they  do 
through  their  seats  on  codetermined  supervisory  boards  (Markovits,  1986;  Muller- 
Jentsch,  1995).  Even  in  areas  where  it does  not  have  formal  codetermination  rights, 
a works  council  can  delay  management  decisions  by  strategically  using  its  rights  in 
other  areas  (Muller-Jentsch,  1995).  The  power  of  the  works  councils  is,  however, 
proscribed  by  the  statutory  ban  on  strikes  to  enforce  workplace  demands.  Moreover, 
in  exercising  their  influence  through  the  mechanism  of  the  works  council,  labour 
representatives,  union  members  or  otherwise,  are  legally  bound  to  act  in  a  manner 
that  promotes  the  overall  health  of the  enterprise  (Muller-Jentsch  1986,  1995). 
Besides  the  formal  institutions  of  codetermination,  the  role  of  labour  unions  in 
collective  bargaining  is an  important  indirect  channel  through  which  workers,  or  more 
precisely  worker  representatives,  can  influence  the  allocation  of corporate  resources. 
The  unions  are  organised  along  industrial  lines  and  come  together  under  an  umbrella 
organisation,  the  DGB  (German  Federation  of  Unions).  Most  employers  are 
members  of  an  employers’  organisations  that  bargain  with  unions  over  wages  and 
other  matters.  Employers’  organisations  are  united  under  the  BDA  (German 
Federation  of  Employers).  Another  employers’  organisation  -- the  BDI  (Federation  of 
German  Industry)  --  deals  with  issues  of economic  policy  (Markovits,  1986;  Baethge 
and  Wolf,  1995). 
The  substance  of  employee  representation  in  German  corporate  governance 
depends  on  how  the  various  channels  of  worker  influence  --  supervisory  board 
representation,  works  councils,  and  union  bargaining  --  interact  with  each  other.  Yet, 
the  restrictions  on  each  of  the  channels  of  employee  influence,  as  well  as  the 
challenges  for  the  labour  movement  in  coordinating  them  do  not  take  from  the  fact 
that,  in  historical  and  comparative  perspective,  codetermination  has  extended 
organisational  control  in  German  industry  beyond  the  narrow  pre-World  War  II 
confines  of managerial  control. 
1.3 Ofganisational  Integration 
The  conditions  of  financial  commitment  and  corporate  control  that  emerged  in 
postwar  Germany  were  complemented  by  institutions  that  supported  the 
organisational  integration  of resources  in  German  business  enterprises.  Of  particular 
importance  in  the  post  World  War  2  era  was  the  West  German  system  of 
apprenticeship  --  the  dual  system  --  that  provided  the  institutional  support  for  the 
integration  of  workers  with  managers  as  insiders  to  the  processes  of  organisational 
learning  that  generated  the  innovative  capabilities  and  competitive  advantages  of 
German  enterprises.  The  German  experience  is  thus  starkly  contrasted  with  that  of 
the  US  where,  to  a  large  extent,  workers  have  been  excluded  from  organisational 
learning  in the  postwar  decades. 
German  companies  initially  acquired  international  competitive  advantage 
from  the  late  19’”  century  primarily  by  developing  and  integrating  skills  within  the 
managerial  structure  rather  than  on  the  shop  floor.  An  apprenticeship  system  in 
Handwerk  existed  that  had  its  roots  in the  guild  system  of craft  apprenticeship  in  the 
Middle  Ages.  It  provided  many  workers  to  the  burgeoning  industrial  sector  but  was 
not  specifically  designed  to  serve  the  needs  of  industry  (Sorge  and  Warner,  1986). 
Many  of the  larger  employers  thus  invested  in their  own  facilities  and  programmes  to 
modify  and  supplement  the  traditional  training  structures.  However,  these  schools 
8 provided  only  minimal  instruction  in  industrial  work  for  traditionally-trained  craftsmen. 
German  employers  controlled  the  workplace,  and  dominated  the  process  of  shop- 
floor  skill  formation  but  generally  proved  unwilling  to extend  organisational  integration 
to their  shop-floor  work  forces. 
The  apprenticeship  training  structures  in  handicraft,  industry,  and  services 
remained  independent  of  each  other  until  the  Nazi  period  (Sorge  and  Warner  1986). 
During  the  last  half  of  the  1930s  and  the  early  194Os,  the  Nazis  mobilised  and 
reorganised  the  productive  capabilities  of  the  German  economy  for  war.  The 
authoritarian  hand  of  the  state  intervened  to  shape  the  skill  formation  process  in  a 
critical  way  by  integrating  the  Handwerk  sector  to  German  industry.  The  training 
system  was  standardised  and  regulated,  thus  laying  the  foundation  for  the  modern 
German  system  of  apprenticeship  (McKitrick,  1994).  After  World  War  2  the 
government  of  the  FRG  retained  training  structures  in  much  the  same  way  that  the 
Nazis  had  shaped  them.  The  regulation  and  administration  of apprenticeship  training 
changed,  however,  to  reflect  changes  in the  social  order. 
The  postwar  German  system  of  apprenticeship  is  a  “dual  system”  that 
combines  formal  vocational  education  and  on-the-job  training.  Specifically,  a  full 
apprenticeship  in this  dual  system  entails  practical  training  in  a company  for  three  or 
four  days  per  week  and  attendance  at  a  vocational  school  (Berufsschule)  for  the 
remainder  of  the  work  week.  The  practical  workplace  training  provides  systematic 
exposure  to the  whole  range  of work  situations  and  problem-solving  tasks  in  a legally 
defined  and  regulated  occupation.  At  the  end  of  three  years  the  apprentice  is 
examined  on  both  theoretical  and  practical  competence,  and  receives  his  skilled 
worker’s  certificate  (Facharbeiterbrief)  (Munch,  various). 
German  training  structures  ensured  that  the  German  production  worker  was 
highly  skilled,  thus  permitting  functions  such  as  maintenance  and  quality  control  to 
be  kept  to  a  large  extent  on  the  shop  floor  (Sorge  and  Warner,  1986,  p.  124).  A 
German  worker’s  skilled  status  was  not  inextricably  tied  to  his  current  job,  and 
German  unions  were  organized  on  an  industrial  rather  than  a  craft  basis. 
Technological  change,  therefore,  did  not  threaten  his  conditions  of  employment  to 
the  same  extent  as  it did  a British  craftsman,  for  whom  the  demarcation  of  his  realm 
of  work  was  a  critical  foundation  of  his  bargaining  power  and  reward  structure. 
Hence  the  virtual  absence  of  demarcation  disputes  in  German  companies 
(Lawrence,  1980,  p.  134;  Sorge  and  Warner,  1986,  p.  101,  125;  Lane,  1989). 
Because  workers  were  versatile  in  the  tasks  that  they  could  perform,  they  could  be 
redeployed  in  response  to  day-to-day  variations  in  staffing  requirements  (Maurice, 
Sellier,  and  Silvestre,  1986,  p. 69).  The  standard  term  in  German  companies  for  this 
redeployment  capability  is  Einsatzbreite,  which  was  used  both  formally  and 
informally  in  evaluating  individual  workers  for  promotion  (Lawrence,  1980,  p.  134). 
The  German  worker’s  understanding  of the  systemic  nature  of  production  enhanced 
his  capacity  for  technical  problem  solving  (Maurice  et  al.  1986,  p.  70;  Sorge  and 
Warner,  1993). 
Employers  and  workers,  through  their  respective  associations,  exerted 
substantial  influence  on  the  structure  of  the  apprenticeship  system.  Trade  unions, 
employers’  associations  and  a  number  of  government  ministries  participated  in  the 
joint  regulation  of the  training  system  at  the  industrial  and  national  levels.  Employer 
and  worker  representatives  influenced  regional  training  policy  through  their 
participation  on  the  vocational  training  committees  of  local  chambers  of  commerce. 
The  unions  exerted  only  an  informal  influence  on  training  at the  enterprise  level,  but 
workers  had  some  influence  over  the  structure  of  in-firm  training  programmes  and 
their  implementation  in  the  workplace  through  the  works  council  (Munch,  various; 
Streeck  et  al,  1987).  The  costs  of  the  apprenticeship  system  were  borne  in  part  by 
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voluntary  participation,  and  in  part  by  apprentices  themselves  in  the  form  of  low 
training  wages  (Munch,  various;  Casey,  1986,  p. 65). 
The  training  structures  that  supported  worker  learning  ensured  that  German 
production  workers  were  highly  skilled.  Central  to  the  postwar  success  of  German 
industry  has  been  the  integration  of  worker  skills  with  the  technical  skills  of 
managers.  German  managers  are  notable  for  the  high  level  of  formal  qualifications 
that  they  hold  (Lawrence,  1980,  p.  76).  The  vast  majority  of  managers  engaged  on 
the  technical  side  of  German  companies  had  engineering  qualifications.  Although 
less  prevalent  on  the  commercial  side,  engineering  nevertheless  boasted  a stronger 
showing  than  any  other  discipline  (Lawrence,  1980,  p. 80;  Lane,  1989). 
Their  strong  technical  backgrounds  gave  managers  a  detailed  knowledge  of 
the  production  process  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  how  to  build  high-quality 
products.  The  formal  structures  of  skill  formation  on  the  commercial  side  of  German 
enterprises  have  historically  been  less  well  developed  than  those  on  the  technical 
side.  German  universities  provided  courses  in  business  economics 
(Befriebswirtschaftslehre),  but  this  distinctively  German  approach  to  business 
education  emphasized  management  operational  techniques  rather  than 
management  as  a  discipline  in  its  own  right.  German  managers  were  traditionally 
rather  sceptical  that  the  qualities  required  in top  managers  could  be effectively  taught 
in  the  systematic  manner  used  in  American  business  education  programs.  As  a 
result  German  post-experience  management  education  programs  have  placed  more 
emphasis  on  building  relationships  among  top  managers  than  on  academic 
instruction.  Business  education  is  also  available  through  the  vocational  system  in 
the  form  of  commercial  apprenticeships  (k&man&he  Lehre).  Like  the  study  of 
business  economics,  however,  these  apprenticeships  have  a strong  production  focus 
(Lawrence,  1980,  p. 65,  Locke,  1984,  1989). 
The  high  level  of formal  qualifications  in German  companies  did  not  reflect  an 
exclusive  reliance  on  university  campuses  as  a  source  of  future  managerial  talent. 
German  companies  did  recruit  for  their  management  structures  from  universities,  in 
particular  favoring  those  graduates  with  an  engineering  degree  (Diplom  Ingenieur) 
(Lawrence,  1980,  p.  76).  These  graduates  were  rarely  admitted  to  senior  levels 
immediately,  however,  and  were  expected  first  to gain  experience  on the  factory  floor 
or  in  other  operational  areas  (Smyser,  1992,  p. 70).  Those  who  were  recruited  by the 
company  without  a  university  degree  could  also  climb  up  the  company  hierarchy,  in 
some  cases  from  the  shop  floor  to the  boardroom.  At the  upper  management  levels, 
about  one-quarter  started  their  careers  as workers  (Maurice  et al,  1986,  p.  118). 
To  travel  this  path,  an  aspiring  manager  had  to  accumulate  formal 
qualifications  in  addition  to  displaying  practical  capability  within  the  firm.  A  network 
of  vocational  schools  facilitated  access  to  the  formal  education  that  allowed  the 
student  to  build  on  his  basic  apprenticeship  training.  Before  1970  the  standard  route 
to  admission  to  an  engineering  course,  at what  was  then  called  an  lngenieurschule, 
was  a  three-and-a-half  year  apprenticeship  (Munch,  1982).  The  engineering 
qualification  offered  by  these  schools,  the  Ing  Grad.,  was  thus  evidence  of  a 
student’s  extensive  academic  and  practical  training.  The  possibility  for  German 
engineers  to  position  themselves  for  managerial  careers  through  apprenticeship  and 
vocational  school  provided  an  alternative  to  the  academic  route  through  a university. 
The  lng.  Grad.  degree  proved  very  popular  among  German  companies,  and  was 
particularly  common  at the  middle  managment  level  (Lawrence,  1980,  p.  66;  Munch, 
1982). 
The  importance  of  additional  formal  education  in  improving  promotion 
prospects  in  German  companies  was  manifest  in  the  close  relationship  between 
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apprenticed  workers  to  become  engineer-managers  promoted  hierarchical 
cooperation  with  a  strong  technological  foundation.  Many  engineers,  and  the  Ing. 
Grad.  in  particular,  held  the  Facharbeiterbrief,  and  thus  shared  a common  theoretical 
and  practical  knowledge  base  with  the  skilled  worker  and  the  foreman  (Meister).  The 
organizational  integration  of  technical  skills  in  the  managerial  and  blue-collar 
structures  of  German  companies  led  to  a  focus  on  quality  in  product  and  process, 
and  many  German  companies  competed  on  the  basis  of  the  excellence  of  their 
goods  and  services  (Streeck,  1992,  p. 341).  This  common  commitment  of  managers 
and  workers  to  the  strategy  of  producing  high-quality  products  also  complemented 
the  extensive  decentralization  of production  decision  making  within  enterprises. 
The  increase  in  the  importance  of  technical  skills  in  building  competitive 
advantage  rendered  functional  expertise,  rather  than  a more  general  entrepreneurial 
capability,  important  as  a  basis  for  top  managerial  authority  in  German  companies 
(Lawrence,  1980,  p.  183).  Although  functional  expertise  may  not  have  been  sufficient 
for  a  candidate  to  be  promoted  to  the  ranks  of  top  management,  the  promotional 
policies  of most  German  companies  meant  that  functional  expertise  was  a necessary 
condition  to  be considered  a candidate  for  top  management  in the  first  place.  In  1979 
based  on  his  study  of fifteen  large  West  German  firms  Heinz  Thanheiser  observed: 
The  managers  at the  highest  level.  even  on the  board,  were  extremely  sceptical  about  the  idea 
of  professionalism  in  management.  They  did  not,  then,  share  the  confidence  that  their 
American  colleagues  had  in  the  transfer  of  “management-know-how,”  confidence  which 
gave  them  the  courage  to  create  the  “conglomerates”.  The  German  leaders  [dirigeants]  view 
diversification  from  a  different  angle:  “we  have  seriously  studied  the  potential  of  Sector  X 
(close  to  us  from  a  technological  standpoint)  into  which  we  could  have  easily  entered.  But 
nobody  on  the  Board  of  Directors  knows  the  market,  the  competitors,  the  clients... 
Consequently  we  don’t  touch  it (Thanheiser.  1979, cited  in Locke,  p. 273)” 
As  Thanheiser  pointed  out,  such  a  view  differed  greatly  from  the  dominant 
perspective  in  American  business  in  the  postwar  decades  (see  also  Dyas  and 
Thanheiser,  1976). 
The  German  postwar  system  of  corporate  governance  transformed  prewar 
managerial  control  into  organisational  control.  Codetermination  of  supervisory 
boards,  works  councils,  intercompany  shareholding  and  the  banks’  relationships  with 
industry,  as  shareholders  and  in  the  exercise  of  depositors’  proxies,  make  it  very 
difficult  to  pinpoint  exactly  where  control  resided  in  major  German  enterprises  in  the 
postwar  decades.  Who  exercised  control  in  particular  German  enterprises  depended 
on  such  particulars  as  the  articles  of  association  that  defined  the  responsibilities  of 
the  various  organs  of  the  corporation,  as  well  as  the  organisational  structure  that  a 
holding  company  put  in  place  to  manage  its  participations,  and  in  particular  on  the 
degree  of  integration  with  the  operations  of the  parent  company  that  such  a structure 
entailed.  But  whatever  the  variations  in  corporate  control  across  particular  German 
enterprises,  the  institutions  discussed  above,  as well  as  other  elements  of  legal  and 
financial  regulation  (Franks  and  Mayer,  1990),  ensured  that  control  over  the 
allocation  of corporate  resources  and  returns  was  an  organisational  phenomenon  in 
the  FRG  in the  postwar  period. 
Yet,  especially  in  comparison  with  post-World  War  II organisational  control  in 
Japan,  organisational  control  in  Germany  has  been  contested  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  Firstly,  the  central  foundations  of  pre-World  War  II  managerial  control  -- 
namely,  bank-enterprise  relations  and  intercompany  shareholding  networks  -- remain 
strong.  Secondly,  whereas  lifetime  employment  and  enterprise  unionism  --  two  key 
11 elements  of  the  Japanese  system  of  governance  --  foster  employee  commitment  to 
the  enterprise,  in  Germany  institutions  such  as  unionism  and  the  system  of  skill 
formation  encourage  competing  loyalties  (Streeck,  1996;  Teague  1997).  Finally,  the 
German  banks,  although  they  have  bolstered  financial  commitment  in  the  postwar 
decades,  have  always  been  much  more  diversified  beyond,  and  independent  of, 
industrial  finance  than  the  Japanese  main  banks.  Their  business  interests  are,  as  a 
result,  more  autonomous  of  those  of  major  German  industrial  enterprises  (for  a 
description  of the  Japanese  system  of corporate  governance,  see  Lazonick  1998). 
2.  Corporate  Governance  and  Performance 
The  institutionalisation  of  organisational  control  in  postwar  Germany  played  a crucial 
role  in  the  competitive  strategies  of  those  West  German  companies  that  competed 
on  the  basis  of  quality,  and  allowed  them  to  develop  a  competitive  advantage  in 
markets  such  as  luxury  automobiles,  precision  machine  tools,  and  electrical 
machinery  --  industries  that  until  recently  qualified  as  stable  technology.  The 
prevalence  and  success  of  high  quality,  niche  market  strategies  in  the  German 
economy,  and  more  fundamentally  the  social  foundations  of  innovation  and 
development  in  Germany  that  supported  these  competitive  strategies,  are  readily 
seen  in  the  structure  of  West  German  foreign  trade.  In  1979  the  leading  German 
exports  were  electrical  and  non-electrical  machinery  which  together  amounted  to 
DM78.2  billion,  chemicals  and  pharmaceuticals  (DM58.8  billion),  and  road  vehicles 
(DM50.3  billion).  Combined  these  industries  accounted  for  62.3  per  cent  of 
manufacturing  exports  but  other  product  groups  were  also  significant  net  exporters 
(OECD,  1995,  p.  146-7).  Indeed,  what  was  distinctive  about  West  Germany’s 
performance,  relative  to  other  advanced  industrial  economies,  was  the  wide  range  of 
industries  in which  she  proved  successful  (Keck,  1993,  p.  135). 
From  the  late  1960s  and  1970s  new  industrial  competitors  and,  in  particular, 
the  Japanese,  mounted  competitive  challenges  for  German  industry  as  they  had  for 
the  Americans.  However,  most  German  producers  whose  competitive  advantage 
was  based  on  their  capacity  to  produce  high  quality  products  managed  to  avoid 
confrontation  with  Japanese  competitors.  In  the  automobile  industry,  for  example, 
luxury  car  producers  such  as  Daimler-Benz,  BMW.  Porsche  and  Audi  were  not 
directly  hit  by  Japanese  competition  and  they  expanded  production  and  employment 
through  the  1970s  (Jurgens  et  al,  p.  36).  In  the  German  car  industry  as  a  whole, 
however,  import  penetration  increased  from  30  per  cent  of  the  German  market  in 
1970  to  41  per  cent  in  1980.  In  1980,  a quarter  of the  imported  cars  were  produced 
in  Japan  (Jiirgens  et  al,  1993,  p.  36);  the  share  of  Japanese  brands  in  total 
registrations  in  Germany  increased  from  0.1  per  cent  in  1970  to  1.7  per  cent  in  1975 
and  then  to  as  high  as  10.4  per  cent  in  1980  (Sachwald,  1994,  p. 65). 
These  changes  largely  confronted  Germany’s  high  volume  car  producers  -- 
VW,  Opel  and  Ford.  All  of  these  companies  experienced  a  sharp  fall  in  output  and 
employment  in  1974-5;  VW,  for  example,  cut  back  employment  by  26  per  cent  or 
nearly  33,000  workers  in  1974-5  (Streeck,  1984,  p.  56ff).  These  companies 
experienced  a  rapid  recovery  after  the  oil  price  crisis,  although  it  was  somewhat 
more  muted  at VW  than  at Opel  and  Ford  (Jurgens  et al,  1993,  p. 36).  But  in the  face 
of  growing  import  penetration  by  the  Japanese,  all  of  the  German  car  producers 
began  to  reorganise  their  production  processes  to  move  upmarket  to  higher  value- 
added  strategies.  They  improved  their  product  designs,  quality  and  product  ranges 
and  focussed  to  an  increasing  extent  on the  European  market  to which  the  Japanese 
producers  had  restricted  access.  With  the  domestic  mass  producers,  especially 
12 Volkswagen,  biting  at  their  heels  the  German  luxury  producers  also  pursued 
upgrading  strategies  during  this  period  (Jurgens  et al,  1993,  59-62;  Streeck,  1989). 
An  important  exception  to  the  sustained  competitive  success  of  the  high 
quality  strategies  of  German  producers  was  the  binocular  and  camera  industry.  The 
Germans  had  achieved  an  apparently  impenetrable  market  position  but  the 
Japanese  managed  to  outcompete  them  through  process  innovation.  By  the  early 
197Os,  German  companies  like  Rollei,  Voigtlander  and  Zeiss,  that  had  previously 
dominated  the  world  market  for  expensive  amateur  photographic  equipment,  were 
reeling  in  the  face  of  competition  from  comparable  quality  but  much  lower-priced 
Japanese  products  (Vogl,  1973,  pp.  131-132). 
The  relative  strength  of  Japanese  producers  in  process  innovation  was  also 
at  the  root  of  their  success  in  competition  with  German  producers  in  industries  in 
which  cost  competition  prevailed  and  in  which  the  Germans  had  failed  to  develop 
distinctive  bases  of  competitive  advantage.  In  both  Germany  and  Japan, 
organisational  integration  is  prevalent,  but  differences  in  the  nature  of  organisational 
learning  and  in  the  social  institutions  that  support  it  are  reflected  in  important 
variations  in  the  innovative  capabilities  of  enterprises.  In  Germany  the  internal 
organisation  of  the  enterprise  derives  from  an  industry-wide  strategy  to  set  high- 
quality  product  standards,  whereas  in  Japan  the  organisational  structure  derives 
from  an  enterprise  strategy  to  engage  in  continuous  problem-solving  to  cut  costs.  In 
industries  such  as  steel  and  consumer  electronics,  for  example,  the  relative  strength 
of Japanese  companies  in process  innovation  was  to  prove  formidable. 
The  German  steel  industry  expanded  rapidly  in the  1950s;  from  1950  to  1960 
German  output  of crude  steel  more  than  doubled  from  14 million  tonnes  to  more  than 
34  million  tonnes  (Esser  and  Vath,  1987,  p. 632).  Production  increased  from  1960  to 
1974  but  the  industry  was  then  already  in  the  throes  of  modernisation  and 
rationalisation;  the  number  employed  in  the  industry  was  reduced  from  418,000  in 
1960  to  346,000  in  1974  (Esser  and  Vath,  1987,  p.  634).  With  the  intensification  of 
competition  in  the  197Os,  the  German  steel  industry  moved  into  crisis.  Japanese 
capabilities  posed  a  serious  competitive  challenge  by  this  time;  in  1975  a  Japanese 
worker  required  6.2  hours  to  produce  a  ton  of  raw  steel;  a  German  worker  8.9,  an 
American  worker  10.5,  a  French  worker  12.1  and  a  British  worker  17.4  (Esser  and 
Fach,  1989,  p.  240).  As  Esser  and  Fach  described  the  competitive  position  of  the 
German  steel  industry:  “[i]n  technology  and  organisation  Japan’s  steel  industry  was 
its  superior,  and  the  Japanese  advantage  held  with  respect  to  product  quality  as  well 
as  production  technology  (Esser  and  Fach,  1989,  p.  240)“.  Production,  exports  and 
profits  in  the  German  steel  industry  all  experienced  major  declines  from  the  mid- 
1970s;  employment  fell  by  60,000  in  the  period  from  1974  to  1980  (Esser  and  Vath, 
1987,  p.  635).  By  1977  the  European  Community  had  introduced  protectionist 
measures  for  the  steel  industry  (Tsoukalis  and  Strauss,  1987).  The  German  steel 
producers  were  generally  hostile  toward  these  measures  but  in  the  event,  these 
measures  gave  West  German  steel  industry  the  space  to  restructure  itself  without 
sparking  social  conflict  (Esser  and  Fach,  1989,  p. 241). 
The  German  consumer  electronics  was  also  severely  affected  by  rising 
foreign  competition.  The  industry  had  grown  rapidly  after  the  war;  in  1950  it 
employed  about  20,000  people  and  by  1970  employment  had  risen  to  127,000 
(Bosch,  1990,  p. 54).  By  1983  40  per  cent  of the  jobs  in  existence  in  1970  had  been 
lost  and  the  industry  was  predominantly  in  foreign  hands.  Once  again  the  main 
challenge  came  from  the  Japanese  who  had  developed  superior  capabilities  in 
improving  product  reliability.  But  they  were  also  strikingly  more  productive;  in  the 
1970s  man  hours  per  television  set  in  Japan  were  1.9  compared  with  3.9  in 
Germany.  The  productivity  difference  has  been  attributed  to the  integrated  approach 
13 to  automation  technology  and  the  intensive  training  of  personnel  at  all  levels  in 
Japanese  firms  (Scibberas,  1977;  Idem.,  1981;  Wengenroth,  1997,  p.  168). 
It  was  not  only  in  the  integration  of  electronics  in  consumer  goods  that 
German  companies  encountered  competitive  problems  during  this  period.  Where  the 
post-World  War  2  system  of  governance  was  least  successful  as  a  basis  for  the 
competitive  advantage  of  German  enterprises  was  in  computers,  semiconductors, 
and  telecommunications,  industries  that  came  into  existence  or  were  completely 
transformed  after  WW2  by  the  development  of  electronics  technology.  Some 
German  companies  competed  in  these  industries,  for  example,  Siemens  and  Bosch 
in  telecommunications,  but  in  general  the  Germans  failed  to  establish  a  national 
competitive  advantage  in  these  sectors  in the  postwar  decades  (see  Malerba,  1985; 
Van  Tulder  and  Junne,  1988;  Sachwald,  1994). 
However,  one  German  high-technology  industry  --  the  pharmaceuticals 
industry  --  performed  extremely  well.  Indeed,  German  enterprises  have  a long  history 
of  competitive  success  in  the  pharmaceuticals  and  chemicals  industry.  One 
important  explanation  for  the  success  of  German  companies  in  pharmaceuticals 
relative  to  other  high-technology  sectors  seems  to  be  rooted  in  the  structure  of  the 
postwar  educational  system  and  in  particular,  its  shortcomings  as  the  basis  for  the 
organisational  integration  of  scientists  into  enterprise  learning  processes;  in  1965 
Japan  had  8  per  cent  more  scientists  and  engineers  employed  in  nonacademic  jobs 
than  West  Germany;  by  the  mid-1980s  the  gap  had  grown  to  27  per  cent  (Keck, 
1993,  p.  141).  The  German  pharmaceuticals  companies  had  benefitted  from  such  an 
integration  but  in  a  much  earlier  era  when  the  educational  system  had  been 
structured  along  different  lines;  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  “technological 
innovation,  based  on  the  country’s  educational  and  research  systems,  was  the  key 
factor  that  enabled  the  [dyestuffs,  synthetic  fertilizers,  and  pharmaceuticals]  industry 
to  establish  itself  as  leader  on the  world  export  market.”  (Keck,  1993,  p.  127). 
The  system  of  organisational  control  had  an  important  influence  not  only  on 
the  patterns  of wealth  generation  in the  Germany  economy  but  also  on  the  manner  in 
which  that  wealth  was  distributed.  It ensured  that  German  employees  participated  in 
the  fruits  of  industrial  success  as  well  as  their  generation.  As  Table  2  shows,  the 
West  Germans  also  managed  to  maintain  a  relatively  low  inequality  of  incomes  as 
they  increased  their  overall  wealth. 
Table  2 Wage  Spread  in  International  Comparison 
country  D9:D5 a  Dl:D5  b  Small Enterprise  CEO Earnings: 
as Percent of  Manual Worker 
Large Enterprise  Earnings  in 
~-  ___- 
Germany  1.63 
C  Manufacturing  d  ._._______-.  “___ ._______----  --- 
0.61  90  10.2 
UK  .  1.72 
Japan  1.63 
USA  2.16 
a Ninth  over  fifth  decile 
b First  over  fifth  decile 
0.68  80  15.5 
0.63  77  7.8 
0.45  57  25.8 
c Average  earnings  of workers  in small  enterprises  as a percentage  of average  earnings  of 
workers  in large  enterprises 
d Ratio  of CEO  Earnings  to Average  Earnings  of Manual  Workers  in Manufacturing 
Source:  Wolfgang  Streeck,  “German  Capitalism:  Does  It Exist?  Can  It Survive?”  in Colin 
Crouch  and  Wolfgang  Streeck,  eds.,  Modern  Capitalism  or Modern  Capitalisms?,  Francis 
Pinter,  1995. 
14 The  system  of  organisational  control  was  important  not  only  in  sharing  the 
gains  from  the  success  of  German  industry;  it  also  facilitated  the  spreading  of  the 
costs  of  industrial  rationalisation.  Social  plans,  which  provided  for  the  protection  of 
workers  in  the  event  of  mass  redundancies,  were  pioneered  in  the  coal  industry  in 
1957  and  in  the  steel  industry  in  1963.  There  were  major  layoffs  in  other  sectors  of 
German  industry  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  but  it  was  only  in  the  Montan  industries, 
where  parity  representation  had  been  established  and  unions  were  strong,  that  these 
plans  were  implemented  (Bosch,  1990,  p. 31).  In the  event,  the  coal  and  steel  social 
plans  were  to  have  an  effect  on  all  sectors  of the  German  economy.  They  were  the 
basis  for  the  compulsory  requirement  of  the  Works  Constitution  Act  of  1972  for  all 
firms  with  more  than  20  employees  to  negotiate  a social  plan  with  the  works  council 
in the  event  of major  changes  in the  firm. 
The  early  social  plans  relied  primarily  on  financial  compensation  to  sustain 
redundant  employees  while  they  looked  for  new  jobs  (Bosch,  1990,  p.  31).  From  the 
mid-1970s  as  the  opportunities  for  redundant  workers  to  find  alternative  jobs 
diminished,  these  plans  relied  heavily  on  early  retirement  schemes  to  ease  the 
burden  of downsizing.  Employers  went  along  with  these  plans  because  they  allowed 
them  to  substantially  reduce  their  labour  forces  without  massive  labour  strife  at  a 
cost  that  was  heavily  subsidised  by the  state’s  early  retirement  schemes.  Particularly 
important  was  the  early  retirement  programme  for  unemployed  workers.  If  an 
employee  was  made  redundant  at  the  age  of  59  he  could  draw  unemployment 
benefits  for  a  year  and  then  qualify  for  a  pension  from  the  Federal  government  at 
age  60.  Employers  made  extensive  use  of this  scheme  by  “firing”  workers  at  59  and 
supplementing  the  unemployment  and  pension  benefits  that  they  received  from  the 
government  (Bosch,  1990,  p. 34; Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  pp.  26-27). 
Figures  for  the  steel  industry  in  North  Rhine  Westphalia  during  the  period 
1976  to  1986,  as  shown  in  Table  3,  illustrate  the  importance  of  early  retirement 
schemes  in  the  process  of  rationalisation.  In  the  steel  industry  alone  approximately 
130,000  jobs,  or  nearly  40  per  cent  of  the  industry’s  employment,  were  eliminated 
from  the  mid-1970s  to  the  mid-1980s.  Many  of  these  job  losses  were  regionally 
concentrated  or  located  in  economically  depressed  parts  of  Germany.  Nevertheless: 
West  Germany  was  alone  among  the  European  steel-producing  countries  in 
contracting  production  and  employment  whilst  preserving  social  peace  (Esser  and 
Fach,  1989,  p.  223).  Early  retirement  was  also  used  extensively  in  the  automobile 
industry.  In the  wake  of the  oil  price  crisis,  for  example,  VW  reduced  employment  by 
33,000  or  26  percent  of  its  workforce  (Streeck,  1984,  p.  56ff).  Notwithstanding  the 
pressures  to  reduce  employment  at  VW,  as  Jurgens,  Malsch,  and  Dohse  noted,  “it 
was  possible  to  achieve  the  reduction  of personnel  by  means  of so-called  “bloodless” 
measures:  voluntary  pay-offs,  early  retirements,  “natural  fluctuation,”  and  a  hiring 
freeze”  (Jurgens  et al,  1993,  p.  116). 
15 Table  3 Rationalisation  of the  steel  industry  in North  Rhine-Westphalia 
No.  of employees,  1976-l  986 
Adjustment  Measures  Hoesch  Krupp  Krupp  Mannes  Thysse  Total 
Kliickn  -mann  n 
er 
Transferred  to  other  group  companies  809  2969  96  6400  5200  1547 
4 
Placement  in other  firms  98  -  98 
Early  retirement  11864  10700  850  (1)  7630  19783  5082 
7 
Other  cuts  in  manning  levels 
(a)  dismissals  for  operational  reasons 
(b)  severance  agreements  and/  or 
redundancy  payment  schemes 
Notes:  (1)  Since  30  September  1983 
1500  -  118  -  4849  (2)  6467 
(2)  Including  foreign  workers  who  departed  under  the  terms  of  legislation  introduced  on  28 
L  November  1983 
6 
Source:  Bosch,  p. 33. 
The  burden  of  rationalisation  was  also  distributed  through  the  use  of  the 
state’s  short-time  working  programme.  If employers  reduced  the  work  hours  of their 
employees,  with  the  works  council’s  approval  they  were  permitted  to  pay  them  only 
for  the  hours  that  they  worked;  the  Federal  Labour  Office  then  paid  them  a prorated 
amount  of the  statutory  unemployment  benefits  for  the  hours  that  they  did  not  work. 
The  scheme  was  made  increasingly  generous  in a number  of ways  during  the  1970s. 
For  example,  before  1969  short-time  benefits  were  available  for  a maximum  duration 
of six  months;  by  1975  the  limit  had  been  extended  to  twenty-four  months.  Thus,  as 
Abraham  and  Houseman  pointed  out,  “[clompanies  engaged  in  long-term 
restructuring  have  been  able  to  minimize  layoffs  by  using  short-time  work  schemes 
while  their  work  force  was  being  reduced  through  attrition  and,  in  many  cases, 
through  early  retirement  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  p. 25).” 
Notwithstanding  the  common  perception  that  measures  to  protect  job  security 
and  to  spread  the  burden  of downsizing  inhibit  the  process  of rationalisation,  a recent 
comparative  analysis  of  restructuring  in  Germany  and  the  US  concluded  that  “[o]n 
the  whole,  the  evidence  that  we  have  examined  suggests  that  German  policies  are 
effective  in  stabilising  employment  in  the  short  run  without  imposing  burdensome 
costs  on  employers...  we  do  not  find  any  consistent  difference  between  the  medium- 
run  responsiveness  of  German  employment  to  changes  in  shipments  and  that  in the 
corresponding  U.S.  industry  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  p. 97).”  However,  they 
identify  primary  metals,  automobiles,  and  nonelectrical  equipment  as  three  industries 
in  which  employment  and  hours  adjustment  in  Germany  were  far  below  that  in  the 
US.*  In  a  previous  study  of  industrial  restructuring  in  the  European  steel  industry, 
one  of  the  authors,  Susan  Houseman,  concluded  that  the  especially  strong 
protection  for  German  workers  in  this  industry,  based  largely  on  the  strength  of  the 
powerful  metalworkers  union  IG  Metall,  inhibited  employment  adjustment  in  the 
medium  term  as  well  as  investment  and  plant  closure  decisions  (Houseman,  1991). 
Abraham  and  Houseman  suggest  that  a similar  analysis  may  apply  to the  automobile 
and  nonelectrical  equipment  industries  where  “the  very  strong  and  somewhat  radical 
metal  workers’  union”  is also  strong  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  p. 99). 
*  German  employment  and  hours  adjustment  were  also  below  the  US  in  nonelectrical 
equipment  and  stone,  clay  and  glass  but  the  authors  argue  that  a  large  part  of  the  difference 
stems  from  differences  in  demand  conditions  in  Germany  and  the  US  (Abraham  and 
Houseman,  1993,  98). 
16 To  fully  assess  the  impact  of  employment  protection  measures  on  economic 
performance,  however,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  look  at  relatively  short-term  (“medium 
term”  is  defined  in  the  Abraham  and  Houseman  study  as  a period  of only  one  and  a 
half  years)  and  adaptive  responses  to  competition.  Of considerable  importance  is the 
relationship  between  employment  protection  and  measures  to  upgrade  products  and 
processes  as  part  of a creative  or  innovative  response  to  competition.  Many  scholars 
have  highlighted  the  importance  of  job  protection  as  one  important  element  in  a 
system  of  governance  that  gives  workers  the  incentives  and  abilities  to  promote 
innovation  precisely  in the  industries  in which  the  unions,  and  especially  IG  Metall,  is 
strong. 
In  the  case  of  the  steel  industry,  for  example,  Kathleen  Thelen,  has  argued 
that: 
Works  councils  tolerate  --  indeed  they  encourage  --  rationalization  investment,  which  they 
see  as  their  only  hope  of  making  the  remaining  jobs  “krisensicher”  (crisis-proof).  Labor’s 
influence  on  supervisory  boards  ensures  that  investment  goes  toward  this  end.  This  has 
meant,  among  other  things,  that  industrial  adjustment  in the  German  steel  industry  has  been 
adjustment  more  within  as  opposed  to  out  of  steel  than  for  example  in  the  United  States 
(Thelen,  199 1, p.  134:  see  also  Thelen,  1987:  Esser  and  Fach.  1989). 
In  the  automobile  industry  the  German  system  of  governance  seems  to  have 
facilitated  technological  change  compared  with,  for  example,  its  British  and  American 
counterparts  (Jurgens  et  al,  1993,  pp.  173-214).  In  his  study  of  the  automobile 
industry  in  the  1970s  and  198Os,  Wolfgang  Streeck  reported  a  “successful 
adjustment  to turbulent  markets”.  Specifically  he  pointed  out  that: 
Codetermination  with  its  peculiar  rules  of  the  game,  has  become  the  institutional  core  of 
what  is  best  described  as  a  firmly  established  productivity  coalition  between  management 
and  labor  at  the  point  of  production.  Prototypically  in  the  automobile  industry. 
codetermination  has  provided  the  basis  for  a  trade  union  policy  of  cooperative 
productivism..  .  The  tendency  of  works  councils  in  West  Germany  to  identify  with  the 
economic  fate  of  their  firm  because  they  are  elected  as  representatives  of  an  enterprise’s 
entire  work  force  is  reinforced  in  the  auto  industry  by, a  keen  sense,  shared  by  the  external 
union.  of  exposure  to  a  volatile  and  competitive  world  market.  As  a  consequence,  hardly 
anywhere  is there  greater  willingness  than  among  automobile  trade  unionists  to think  through 
and  accept  the  consequences  of  labor-management  cooperation.  Together  with  the 
opportunities  offered  by  the  framework  of  industrial  unionism  and  codetermination,  this  has 
given  rise  in the  1970s  and  1980s  to  an  interactive  configuration  of  policies  and  institutional 
structures  which  appears  to  have  formed  a  “virtuous  circle ” ideally  matched  to,  and  indeed 
almost  making  inevitable,  an  industrial  strategy  of  upmarket  restructuring  (Streeck,  1989.  pp. 
128-9). 
While  the  German  system  of  organisational  control  has  played  an  important 
role  in  sharing  the  gains  and  losses  of the  process  of development,  in doing  so  it has 
proven  most  successful  in  advancing  the  interests  of  skilled,  male,  German  workers 
in  industries  in which  the  representation  of their  interests  is  strongest  and  where  the 
organisational  integration  of  their  skills  is  critical  to  the  competitive  success  of 
industrial  enterprises.  These  workers  gained  most  from  the  rising  prosperity  of  the 
postwar  decades.  The  system  was,  however,  much  less  of  a  boon  to  contingent 
members  of the  labour  force,  those  euphemistically  described  as  Gastarbeiter  (guest 
workers)  in  Germany,  as  well  as  to  women.  The  account  by  Esser  and  Vath  of  the 
17 strategy  of  IG  Metall  toward  the  restructuring  of the  steel  industry  is worth  quoting  at 
length: 
The  circle  of  those  who  were  energetically  defended  was  limited.  and  in  itself  carefully 
graded;  the  top  rank  consisted  of  the  most  eflcient  and  productive  nucleus  of  the  labour 
force,  because  it  is  from  here  that  the  union  recruited  its  membership  predominantly.  Next 
came  the  group  of  old  workers,  highly  threatened  by  redundancy  and  therefore  to  be 
conciliated  by  all  possible  means  of  rhetoric.  They  were  mostly  old  union  members,  with  a 
higher  interest  in  honourable  social  programmes  than  in  safe  jobs.  It  was  not  the  union’s 
problem  what  happened  to  these  men  when,  after  a  life  of  hard  work  in  the  steel  mills, 
followed  by  early  retirement,  the  first  wave  of  euphoria  had  gone,  and  the  feeling  of 
uselessness  set  in.  Young  employed  can  also  be  sure  of  provoking  any  amount  of  verbal 
welfare.  Yet  here  again,  it  was  not  the  concern  of  IG  Metal1  to  help  them  really,  when 
existing  jobs  had  disappeared  through  rationalisation,  and  recruitment  to  the  steel  plants  had 
virtually  ended.  Guest  workers  were  left  without  any  union  protection  and  were  therefore,  as 
a  rule  dismissed  first,  likewise  those  ‘black  sheep’  who  were  already  in  the  bad  books  of 
personnel  departments,  shop-floor  supervisors  and  works  councillors.  and  whose  poor  work 
record  gave  good  enough  reasons  for  sacking.  Briefly,  IG  Metal1  accepted  a  reconstruction 
policy  for  the  steel  industry  which  was  characterised  by  the  need  for  competitiveness  on  the 
international  market,  and  it  merely  stressed  the  need  for  a sqfi&  net  of  social  programmes, 
retraining,  further  training,  etc.  IG Metal1  did  not  look  for  an alternative  to  this  logic.  Instead 
it  fully  exploited  the  advantages  of  its  strategy  --  without  paying  the  price;  more  precisely, 
the  union,  in company  with  the  State  and  industry,  made  the  fringe  groups  of  the  labour  force 
pay  that  price  (Esser  and  Vath,  1987,  p. 659,  emphasis  in original). 
The  importance  of guest  workers  in the  German  labour  force  grew  steadily  in 
the  decades  after  the  war  to  reach  8.1  per  cent  of total  employment  in  1970  (Giersch 
p.  127).  These  workers  have  tended  to  be treated  as  a buffer  stock  of flexible  labour 
to  insulate  the  domestic  workforce  from  layoffs  as  evidenced  by  the  higher  rate  of 
unemployment  experienced  by  foreign  workers  in  the  latter  part  of  the  1970s  and 
during  the  1980s  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  pp.  124-5).  In times  of  recession 
foreign  workers  have  often  been  “persuaded”  to  return  to their  native  lands;  indeed  in 
1983  the  German  government  offered  payments  to  foreign  workers  who  were 
unemployed  or  on  short-time  work  if they  left  Germany  with  their  families  (Abraham 
and  Houseman,  1993,  p.  125).  Significant  attempts  have,  however,  been  made  to 
give  these  workers  the  chance  to  improve  their  employment  opportunities,  especially 
by  encouraging  them  to  participate  in  the  dual  training  system.  Foreigners’  share  of 
apprentices  increased  from  2.8  per  cent  in  1985  to  6.7  per  cent  in  1990  although 
they  are  still  underrepresented  in  the  apprenticeship  system  compared  with  their 
importance  in the  workforce  (Winkelmann,  1996,  p. 663). 
Nor  have  women  directly  participated  in  the  gains  of  postwar  economic 
development  to  the  same  extent  as  men.  Their  employment  opportunities  have,  in 
general,  been  more  limited  than  those  available  to  men.  The  workforce  participation 
rate  of  German  women  was,  at  around  40  per  cent  in  the  1960s  and  197Os,  among 
the  lowest  in the  advanced  industrial  economies.  Moreover,  the  German  women  that 
did  work  were  disproportionately  concentrated  in  low-skilled  jobs.  This  pattern 
undoubtedly  reflects,  at  least  in  part,  a  lower  average  tenure  than  their  male 
counterparts  which,  because  of the  emphasis  on  continued  education  as  the  means 
to  promotion  in the  German  employment  system,  is a particular  handicap  to women’s 
career  advancement  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  pp.  114-123). 
18 3.  Economic  Challenges  to  German  Governance 
In  recent  decades  the  institutional  foundations  of  organisational  control  in  Germany, 
as  in  Japan,  have  proven  to  be  more  enduring  than  in  the  United  States  (Lazonick 
and  O’Sullivan,  1997).  Nevertheless  various  pressures  on  the  German  system  of 
governance  have  emerged  and,  in  combination,  have  posed  and  continue  to  present 
a  challenge  to  the  sustainability  of  German  organisational  control,  at  least  in  its 
postwar  form.  Some  of  these  pressures  emanate  from  sources  external  to  the 
operation  of  the  domestic  economic  system  such  as  the  process  of  European 
integration  and  German  reunification.  The  more  powerful  pressures,  however,  are 
productive  and  financial  challenges  that  are  integrally  related  to  the  structure  of  the 
West  German  economy  and  they  are  the  focus  of  the  following  discussion. 
International  competition,  emanating  especially  from  Japan,  has  become  an  even 
more  formidable  challenge  to  German  organisational  integration  as  a basis  on  which 
to  compete  in  international  markets.  Increased  pressures  for  financial  liquidity  are 
also  discernible  and  can,  to  a  considerable  extent,  be  traced  to  growing 
intergenerational  dependence. 
3.1  Productive  Challenges 
Industries  that  had  already  contracted  like  steel,  shipbuilding,  coalmining,  and 
consumer  electronics  (Bosch,  1990,  p.  54)  were  hit  by  new  job  losses  in  the  early 
1980s.  For  example,  employment  in  iron  and  steel  fell  from  624,000  in  1979  to 
473,000  in  1991  and  in  shipbuilding  from  60,000  in  1979  to  34,000  in  1991  (OECD, 
1996,  p.  142).  In  contrast,  production  and  employment  expanded  in  sectors  of 
particular  German  strength.  During  the  period  from  1979  to  1991,  employment 
increased  from  971,000  to  1,077,OOO in  non-electrical  machinery  (excluding  office 
and  computing  machinery),  from  876,000  to  963,000  in  transport  equipment,  from 
923,000  to  987,000  in  metal  products,  from  996,000  to  1118,000  in  chemical 
products  and  from  578,000  to  677,000  in  electrical  machinery  (excluding  radio,  TV 
and  communication  equipment).  The  export  performance  of  these  industries  also 
proved  extremely  strong,  especially  in the  second  half  of the  1980s. 
The  success  of  these  industries  contributed  to  Germany’s  strengthening 
export  position  during  this  period.  As  a  whole,  the  German  economy  continued  to 
grow  during  the  1980s  and  the  reunification  process  prompted  a further  upsurge  in 
economic  performance  around  1989.  However,  unemployment  rose  substantially  in 
the  early  198Os,  although  it  remained  at  a  lower  level  than  in  the  United  States  for 
most  of  the  decade  and  much  lower  than  in  most  other  European  countries.  By  the 
end  of  the  1980s  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  “Rhenish  system  of  capitalism”  to 
deliver  economic  performance  without  sacrificing  social  cohesion  was  running  at  an 
all time  high  (Albert,  1991). 
When  the  dust  settled  in  the  early  199Os,  however,  it  became  clear  that 
throughout  the  1980s  the  competition  that  German  enterprises  faced  on  international 
product  markets  had  intensified  further.  Besides  the  structural  problems  that 
reunification  posed,  key  industrial  sectors  in  the  former  West  German  economy 
faced  a  systematic  challenge  from  international  and,  in  particular,  Japanese 
competition.  By  1992  the  German  economy  had  plunged  into  the  worst  recession 
since  World  War  2.  Among  the  industries  that  were  worst  hit  were  automobiles  and 
machine  tools,  the  great  bastions  of German  postwar  industrial  strength. 
Employment  in  the  motor  vehicles  industry  had  increased  from  699,000  in 
1979  to  823,000  in  1991.  Exports  had  more  than  doubled  in current  DM  prices  during 
the  same  period.  All  of  the  West  German  car  producers  had  increased  their 
production  in  the  1980s  and  were  hit  heavily  by  the  slump  that  followed  the  decade 
19 of expansion.  VW  and  Opel  reduced  production  by  25  per  cent,  Audi  by  31  per  cent, 
Ford  by  30  per  cent  and  BMW  by  12  per  cent  in  1993/4.  Only  Mercedes-Benz 
managed  to  increase  sales  by  launching  a new  series.  The  successful  introduction  of 
luxury  cars  by  Toyota  and  Nissan,  however,  suggested  that  the  sustainability  of  the 
German  company’s  success  could  not  be taken  for  granted. 
Concerns  about  the  German  automobile  industry’s  competitiveness  had 
already  been  heightened  by the  publication  in  1991  of a German-language  version  of 
The  Machine  that  Chanqed  the  World,  the  MIT  comparative  study  of  the  auto 
industry,  particularly  when  it  was  revealed  that  the  European  plant  held  up  to 
unfavourable  scrutiny  for  its  low  productivity  was  Daimler-Benz’s  most  important 
assembly  plant.  (Womack  et  al,  1990).  Other  symptoms  of  serious  underlying 
problems  were  also  to  be  found  in  the  rapid  growth  of  automobile  imports  to 
Germany  during  the  1980s;  the  share  of  Japanese  brands  in  total  German  car 
registrations  had  risen  from  10.4  per  cent  in  1980  to  25.3  per  cent  in  1991 
(Sachwald,  1994,  p.  65).  Moreover,  a substantial  proportion  of  German  export  gains 
in  the  1980s  had  been  won  in  European  markets  that  were  still  relatively  protected 
from  Japanese  competition  (Keck,  1993,  p.  136). 
The  machine  tool  industry  also  faced  serious  challenges  from  foreign 
competitors.  The  traditional  competitive  advantage  of  German  machine  tool 
producers  had  been  based  on  their  ability  to  produce  high-quality  customised 
machines  for  which  cost  considerations  were  secondary  in  influencing  demand.  By 
the  1990s  however,  Japanese  competitors  had  succeeded  in  developing  their 
standard  machines  so  that  they  could  perform  many  functions  previously  possible 
only  with  highly  specialised  machines  (Schumann  et  al,  1994;  Herrigel,  1996,  p.  37). 
Symptoms  of  emerging  competitive  problems  were  discernible  in  the  1980s. 
Although  the  German  share  of export  markets  held  steady  during  the  198Os,  German 
enterprises  were  weak  in  the  most  rapidly  expanding  markets  for  machine  tools;  in 
1988,  German  producers  accounted  for  only  9.3  per  cent  of  machinery  imports  by 
south-east  Asian  NlCs  compared  with  50.4  per  cent  from  Japan  and  26.4  per  cent 
from  the  US  (VDMA,  quoted  in  Deutsche  Bank  Bulletin,  January  1991,  p.  3). 
Between  1991  and  1993  the  value  of  German  machine  tool  production  fell  from 
DM17  billion  to  DM12  billion  (Economist,  October  16,  1991;  July  16,  1994).  Despite  a 
recovery  of  orders  in  1994,  Japanese  machine  tool  makers  maintained  a 
considerable  cost  advantage  over  their  German  competitors. 
As  Table  4  shows,  the  economics  of  German  machine  tool  producers  had 
been  deteriorating  relative  to  their  Japanese  competitors  for  some  time.  Japanese 
productivity,  measured  by  value  added  per  employee,  was  double  that  of  German 
machine  tool  companies  throughout  the  1980s  (Englmann  et  al  1994,  p,  37).  In  part, 
the  difference  can  be  attributed  to the  longer  hours  worked  by  the  Japanese;  in  1990 
hours  worked  per  employee  in  Japan  were  2,197  compared  with  1,604  in  Germany. 
But  the  Japanese  performance  also  reflected  their  success  at  integrating  human  and 
physical  resources  to  generate  continuous  innovation  (Finegold  et al,  1994,  p. 23). 
20 Table  4  Comparative  Performance  of  German  and  Japanese  Machine  Tool 
Companies 
Per employee,  thousands  of DM 
1980  1985  1989 
German  enterprises 
-- Sales  109  138  174 
-- Staff  expenditure 
-- Value added 
JaDanese  en terwises 
45  55  64 
55  63  77 
-- Sales  315  391  447 
-- Staff  exDenditure  48  59  67 
1 -- Value added  119  147  166 
Source:  Adapted  from  Englmann  et al,  1994,  p. 37 
In  general  in  machine-based  industries,  where  process  innovation  has  been 
important  in  driving  down  costs,  the  Japanese  have  been  able  in  recent  years  to 
generate  organisational  learning  that,  even  in  industries  such  as  precision  machine 
tools  and  luxury  automobiles  in  which  the  Germans  were  previously  unrivalled,  has 
permitted  the  Japanese  to  move  into  progressively  higher  quality  market  segments 
at  lower  unit  costs.  The  industries  in  which  the  Germans  were  competitively  strong 
and  that  have  historically  been  considered  stable  technology  have  been  transformed 
by the  Japanese  who  have  leveraged  their  flexibility  at the  enterprise  level  as  a basis 
for  continuous  innovation  (Schumann  et  al,  1994;  Herrigel,  1995;  Herrigel  1996,  p. 
36). 
The  key  organisational  advantage  of  Japanese  companies  that  has  allowed 
them  to  generate  superior  performance  relative  to  their  German  competitors  seems 
to  be  their  capacity  to  achieve  cross-functional  integration  on  the  shop  floor  as  well 
as  in  management  structures3  German  enterprises,  like  their  Japanese  counterparts 
and  in  contrast  to  most  American  companies,  have  in  the  postwar  period  attained 
considerable  success  in  organising  the  hierarchical  integration  of  technical  skills. 
However,  two  key  features  of  the  German  system  that  facilitated  hierarchical 
integration  --  specialised  skills  among  production  workers  and  functional  divisions 
within  the  managerial  organisation  --  impeded  cross-functional  integration 
(Schumann  et  al,  1994,  pp.  643-64;  Herrigel,  1995;  Idem.,  1996,  pp.  38-43;  Jurgens 
and  Lippert,  1997). 
The  weaknesses  of  the  German  system  of  organisational  integration  in 
facilitating  cooperation  across  functions  is  rendering  them  vulnerable  in  competition 
with  the  Japanese.  Herrigel  argues  that  the  problems  with  the  German  system  are 
readily  apparent  in the  development  of new  products: 
Each  time  a new  product  or a new  technology  is introduced  -- as opposed  to  an old  one  that  is 
customised  for  a  customer  --  the  various  roles  that  each  of  the  categories  of  skill  and 
management  will  play  in  the  production  and  development  of  the  new  product  must  be 
bargained  out.  Each  currently  existing  cluster  of  expertise  and  institutional  power,  naturally, 
wants  to  participate;  each  has  its  own  ideas  and  solutions;  each  defends  its  turf  against 
encroachments  from  the  others;  each  takes  for  granted  that  it should  have  a  legitimate  place 
in the  new  arrangement  within  the  firm.  Electrical  masters  and  technicians,  for  example,  will 
fight  with  mechanical  ones  both  on  the  shop-floor  and  in  the  design  studios  over  different 
kinds  of  technical  or  manufacturing  solutions  to  problems  that  have  direct  consequences  for 
the  amount  and  character  of  work  that  each  will  have  to do and  on  the  overall  value  that  their 
role  within  the  firm  will  contribute  to the  value  of the  product  (Herrigel.  1996,  p. 42). 
3 For  a discussion  of cross-functional  integration  in Japan,  see  Lazonick,  1997 
21 There  now  seems  to  be  a widespread  recognition  among  employers,  workers 
and  unions  in  Germany  of  the  existence  of  organisational  problems.  They  are, 
predictably,  proving  extremely  difficult  to  solve.  For  German  industry  as  a  whole  to 
move  from  one  system  of  organisational  integration  to  another  would  require  a 
veritable  social  transformation  of  enterprise  organisations  and  social  institutions. 
Herrigel  describes  the  day-to-day  obstacles  to  such  a  transformation  as  forming  a 
dynamic  process  of  “self-blockage”  which  involves  all  stakeholders,  be  they  workers 
or  managers,  who  have  entrenched  interests  to  protect.  He argues  that: 
[flew  producers,  large  or  small,  have  had  success  up until  now  in being  able  to  overcome  the 
opposition  of  entrenched  groupings  of  skilled  workers  threatened  with  the  loss  of  status 
through  incorporation  into  teams  that  deny  the  boundaries  of  former  jurisdictional 
specializations  or  of  independent  departments,  reluctant  to  have  their  functional  areas  of 
power  within  the  firms  redefined  and  diluted  through  recomposition  with  other  areas.  It  is 
difficult,  after  all, to tell  workers  and  managers  who  with  considerable  legitimacy  understand 
themselves  as  having  contributed  significantly  to  the  traditional  success  of  high  quality 
manufacturing  in  Germany  that  their  roles  have  become  obstacles  to  adjustment  (Herrigel, 
1996,  p. 43). 
In  all  of  the  industries  in  which  they  have  previously  been  highly  successful 
German  enterprises  are  currently  able  to  produce  and  to  export  quite  successfully. 
They  are  likely  to  continue  to  be  able  to  do  so  for  some  time,  despite  intensified 
competition,  because  of  the  depth  of  organisational  capabilities  that  reside  in  these 
companies.  Indeed,  the  temptation  of adaptation  is perhaps  the  major  obstacle  to  the 
fundamental  transformation  of  their  organisations  that  is  necessary  if  German 
enterprises  are  to  recreate  the  foundations  on  which  they  can  compete  effectively  in 
the  future.  In the  absence  of  a creative  response  in these  industries  the  future  does 
not  look  bright  for  German  industry.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  high-technology  sector  of 
the  economy,  given  its  current  condition,  will  be  capable  of  making  up  for  the  loss  of 
wealth  generating  capacity  in  the  medium-technology  industries.  Indeed,  the 
deficiencies  of  the  German  system  of  governance  with  regard  to  cross-functional 
integration  have  arguably  proven  even  more  debilitating  in  industries  such  as 
computers  and  semiconductors. 
4.2  Financial  Challenges 
Critical  to  the  responses  of  German  enterprises  to  the  competitive  challenges  that 
they  now  face  will  be  the  extent  to  which  financial  commitment  is  forthcoming  from 
the  German  system  of  governance.  In  recent  decades,  financial  commitment  has 
proven  to  be  more  robust  in  Germany  than  in  the  United  States  but  whether  it  will 
continue  to  be  so  is  an  open  question.  There  are  clear  indications  of  an  increasing 
emphasis  on  financial  liquidity  in the  German  system  of governance  which,  if it gains 
momentum,  will  exacerbate  the  existing  organisational  problems  in German  industry. 
Growing  systematic  pressures  for  financial  liquidity  are  rooted  in  the  rising  level  of 
savings  generated  by  the  country’s  postwar  economic  success.  They  are  likely  to  be 
strengthened  as  intergenerational  dependence  grows  in Germany. 
The  Federal  government  controlled  interest  rates  after  the  war,  thus  limiting 
interest-rate  competition  not  only  among  different  sectors  of the  banking  sector,  but 
also  from  savings  instruments  provided  by  other  financial  enterprises  (Schneider  et 
al,  1978;  Francke  and  Hudson,  1984,  p.  81).  The  objective  of this  restriction  was  to 
stabilize  the  banking  system  and  thus  protect  depositors;  its  effect  was  seen  in  the 
channelling  of  the  vast  majority  of  German  savings  through  the  banking  sector; 
22 although  the  formation  of  monetary  assets  was  limited  during  the  1950s  about  75 
percent  of  these  assets  was  channelled  into  the  banking  sector  (Francke  and 
Hudson,  1984,  p. 76). 
As  their  incomes  expanded,  Germans  were  able  to  save  more,  and  the 
success  of  public  campaigns  and  state  subsidies  to  promote  saving  led  to  the 
emergence  of  higher  aggregate  saving  rates  in  Germany  than  in  the  US  by  the 
1960s.  Automatic  wage  deposits  for  workers  helped  mass  consumer  banking  to 
become  the  major  source  of  expansion  in  the  banking  business  in  the  1960s.  Once 
restrictions  on  branch  banking  were  removed  in  1958,  competition  in  the  banking 
sector  occurred  primarily  through  the  expansion  of  branch  networks  (Francke  and 
Hudson,  1984;  Deeg,  1991).  In  1970,  as  Table  5  shows,  claims  against  banks 
accounted  for  almost  60  percent  of the  financial  assets  of  German  households,  and 
over  three-quarters  of these  bank  deposits  were  in savings  accounts. 
Table  5  Structure  of Financial  Assets  of Private  Households 
% of total private financial  assets 
Assets  1970  1992  1993 
total 
Germanv 
Bank  Deposits 
Cash  and  Sight  Deposits 
Time  Deposits 
Savings  Deposits 
Savings  Certificates 
Savings  and  Loan  Deposits 
Insurance  (1) 
Fixed-income  Securities  (2) 
Stocks  (3) 
Investment  Fund  Certs 
52.4  40.7 
10.6  8.0 
1.8  8.0 
39.1  19.4 
0.9  5.3 
7.6  3.7 
13.3  18.5 
7.7  20.9 











Other  Receivables  (4) 
(1)  include.  life  insurance  and  pensions 
(2)  include.  bond  fund  shares 
(3)  include  stock  fund  shares 
7.7  11.0  7.4 
(4)  include  pension  claims  within  the  company 
Source:  Deutsche  Bank  Research  Bulletin,  January  9,  1995,  p.7. 
In  the  1950s  and  1960s  competition  for  the  rapidly  growing  funds  of  German 
savers  took  place  primarily  among  the  savings  banks,  the  private  banks  and  the 
cooperative  banks.  In  1970  the  savings  banks  dominated  the  market  with  58.8  per 
cent  of total  savings  deposits;  the  credit  cooperatives  followed  with  18.2  per  cent  and 
then  the  private  banks  with  17.3  per  cent  (Oberbeck  and  Baethge,  1989,  p.  285). 
During  the  1970s  investors  began  to  move  out  of  bank  deposits  and  into  higher 
yielding  savings  instruments.  As  Table  5  shows,  the  proportion  of  financial  assets 
held  as  savings  deposits  in  banks  was  almost  halved  during  the  period  from  1970  to 
1992.  Insurance  investments  increased  from  13.3  per  cent  of  private  financial  assets 
in  1970  to  18.5  per  cent  in  1992.  The  share  of  fixed-interest  securities  in  financial 
assets  also  showed  a substantial  increase  from  7.7  percent  in  1970  to  20.9  percent 
in  1992.  In  the  1980s  and  early  1990s  mutual  funds  increased  their  share  of  private 
financial  assets.  By  the  end  of  1993  they  accounted  for  6.3  percent,  up  from  2 
percent  at the  end  of  1980  (Deutsche  Bank  Research,  January  1995,  p. 8). 
The  absolute  volume  of  private  financial  assets  also  expanded  dramatically 
from  1970.  Between  1972  and  1988  the  financial  assets  of German  households  rose 
by  290  per  cent  compared  with  an  increase  in  their  total  income  of  150  per  cent.  At 
23 the  end  of  1988,  households  had  accumulated  a  massive  DM2.6  trillion  (gross)  in 
financial  assets  which  amounted  to  nearly  twice  their  annual  disposable  income 
((Deutsche  Bank  Bulletin,  June  1989,  p.  10).  By the  end  of  1993,  private  households 
in  Germany  as  a whole  had  financial  assets  amounting  to  nearly  DM4.2  trillion;  94.5 
per  cent  of  these  assets  were  held  by  West  German  households  (Deutsche  Bank 
Bulletin,  January  9,  1995,  p. 6). 
The  changes  in the  structure  and  level  of German  financial  assets  are  striking 
in  historical  perspective.  Yet,  the  pressures  for  financial  liquidity,  although  increasing 
rapidly,  have  to  date  proven  much  weaker  than  in the  United  States.  In  particular,  the 
German  savings  system  has  not  generated  anything  approaching  the  vast  liquid 
funds  under  management  by  US  financial  institutions.  There  has  been  a  significant 
increase  since  1960  in  personal  provision  for  pensions  through  contributions  to  life 
assurance  enterprises  and  private  pension  funds;  in  1989  32.7  percent  of 
households’  total  net  acquisition  of  financial  assets  was  placed  with  insurance 
enterprises  compared  with  18.1  percent  in  1960  (Edwards  and  Fischer,  1994,  p,  53). 
As  a  result  of  this  trend,  as  Table  5  shows,  insurance  investments  made  up  about 
19.8  percent  of  private  assets  at  the  end  of  1992  compared  with  13.3  percent  in 
1970.  There  are,  however,  restrictions  on  the  proportions  of  the  assets  of  pension 
funds  and  insurance  companies  held  in  different  types  of  assets  which  has  limited 
the  pressures  for  financial  liquidity  from  this  source.  For  example,  the  limit  for 
domestic  equities  is 30  per  cent;  it is 6 per  cent  for  foreign  equities.  In  1994,  German 
pension  funds  put  about  72  per  cent  of their  assets  in domestic  bonds  and  only  9 per 
cent  in  equities  (Queisser,  1996,  p.  14).  The  investment  limit  was,  however,  only 
increased  to  30  per  cent  for  domestic  equities  in  1990  from  a  maximum  of  5  per 
cent. 
The  comparative  difference  in pension  funds  under  management  also  reflects 
the  way  in  which  German  employers  fund  the  pensions  that  they  provide  to 
employees.  Employer  pensions  were  originally  introduced  as  elements  in  the 
compensation  packages  offered  to  key  workers  to  keep  them  with  specific 
companies,  mainly  larger  companies,  when  labor  markets  became  tight  from  the 
mid-1950s.  In  more  recent  periods  of  relatively  high  unemployment,  some  German 
companies  have  reduced  these  benefits.  Moreover,  changes  in  German  pension  law 
in  1974  that  allowed  workers  to transfer  their  pensions  from  one  company  to  another 
have  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  this  device  for  retaining  workers.  The  number  of 
workers  covered  under  these  schemes  fell  from  70  to  66  per  cent  of  all  industrial 
workers  (Queisser,  1996,  p.  12).  Nevertheless,  these  pensions  represent  a 
significant  accumulation  of  pension  liabilities  in  the  German  economy;  in  1993  the 
total  pension  obligations  of  companies  amounted  to  c.  DM  460.6  billion  (Queisser, 
1996,  p.  12). 
Company  pensions  are  financed  through  private  pension  funds  or 
“Pensionskassen”.  Employers  and  employees  generally  make  contributions  to  these 
funds  and  the  investment  behaviour  of these  funds  is  regulated  by  the  life  insurance 
laws  (Turner  and  Watanabe,  1995).  Some  employer  pensions  are  funded  by  direct 
insurance  (Direktversicherungen)  through  a life  insurance  company.  Another  channel 
for  employer  pensions  consists  of  support  funds  (Unterstijtzungskassen).  These 
funds  are  legal  entities  that  are  financed  by  allocations  of  resources  from  the 
employer  company  but  are  legally  separate  from  it. The  funds  are  generally  lent  back 
to  the  employer  company  as  an  interest-bearing  loan  (Turner  and  Watanabe  1995  p. 
97).  As  Table  6 shows,  these  three  channels  together  comprise  just  over  40  per  cent 
of employer  pension  assets  in Germany. 
The  remainder,  nearly  60  per  cent  of  the  funds  earmarked  for  the  payment  of 
company  pensions,  remain  in  the  company  as  book  reserves.  The  company  builds 
24 up  its  pension  reserves  (Pensionrijckstellung)  and  the  increases  in  its  pension 
liabilities  are  tax-deductible.  The  company  is  permitted  to  invest  the  funds  allocated 
to  pension  obligations  in  the  normal  course  of  its  business.  In  effect,  this  system 
affords  the  company  a  tax-effective  means  of  borrowing  from  its  employees.  As 
Table  1 shows,  company  pension  funds  were  used  to  finance  almost  5  per  cent  of 
the  net  investment  of  German  producing  enterprises  in  the  period  from  1980-1989 
and  thus  represent  a more  important  source  of finance  for  industrial  enterprises  than 
equity  issues..  For  large  manufacturing  A.G.s  provisions  for  pensions  were  even 
more  important,  accounting  for  nearly  15  per  cent  of  their  net  investment  in  the 
period  1970-85  (Edwards  &  Fischer,  1994,  p.  128)  Major  German  A.G.s  have 
enormous  pension  reserves  on  their  balance  sheets;  as  Hauck  put  it,  “Siemens  has 
over  DM  14 bn  of pension  reserves  and  can  be  compared  in this  respect  with  a good 
medium-sized  life  insurance  company  (Hauck,  1994,  p.  557).  The  importance  of 
book  reserves  has  fallen  since  1981  from  67  per  cent  of  all  occupational  pension 
assets.  In  contrast,  direct  insurance  has  increased  its  share  from  under  5 per  cent  in 
1981  (Queisser,  1996,  p.  p.  14).  Nevertheless,  the  accumulation  of  book  reserves 
remains  the  prevalent  practice  with  regard  to  German  employer  pensions  and  thus 
limits  pension  funds  under  management  compared  with  the  US. 
Table  6 Allocation  of Employer  Pension  Assets  in Germany 
% of total,  1991 
Type  of plan  % of total  pension  assets 
Book  reserves  58 
Private  fund  22 
Direct  insurance  11 
Support  fund  9 
Total  100 
Source:  Ahrend,  Peter.  1995.  “Pension  Financial  Security  in Germany,”  in  Bodie,  Zvi,  Mitchell, 
O.,  and  J.  Turner,  eds.,  Securing  employer-Based  Pensions:  An  International  Perspective, 
Philadelphia,  University  of  Pennsylvania  Press. 
The  final  and  most  important  reason  for  the  differences  between  the  Germany 
and  the  US  in  accumulated  pension  funds  under  management  is  the  relative 
importance  of  the  state  pension  system  in  Germany.  As  Table  7  shows,  social 
security  accounts  for  nearly  70  per  cent  source  of the  retirement  income  of  German 
pensioners;  in  the  US,  by  comparison,  social  security  contributes  about  40  per  cent 
of  retirement  income  (Turner  and  Watanabe,  1995,  p.  136).  As  a  pay-as-you-go 
system,  the  German  government  pension  system  generates  no  reservoir  of  surplus 
funds  to  be  allocated.  Instead,  almost  75  per  cent  of  the  financing  for  the  system 
comes  from  employee  and  employer  contributions  on  the  basis  of  earnings  up  to  a 
ceiling  of  1.8  times  the  average  gross  earnings  of  all  insured  individuals;  the 
remainder  is  paid  by  the  federal  government  out  of  general  revenues  (World  Bank, 
1994,  p. 361). 
25 Table  7  Sources  of Retirement  Income  in Germany 
% of total,  1992 
Source  Percentage  of retirement  income 
Social security  68.8 
Public  employer  pensions  14.4 
Private  employer  pensions  5.3 
Other  11.7 
Total  100.0 
Source:  Schmahl,  Winfried.  1994.  “Umbau  der  Sozialen  Sicherung  im  Alter?  Zur  Diskussion 
Uber  Die  Weitere  Entwicklung  der  Alterssicherungin  Deutschland,”  in  Staatswissenschaften 
und  Staatspraxis. 
There  has  been  a  steady  increase  in  the  social  insurance  premium  rates  in 
Germany  since  1960.  The  contribution  for  pensions  constitutes  the  largest  element 
of this  premium  and  it rose  from  14 per  cent  in  1960  to  19.2  per  cent  in  1994.  At  the 
beginning  of  1997  it was  further  increased  to  20.3  per  cent  (Deutsche  Bundesbank, 
Monthly  Report,  September  1997,  p.  42).  The  levy  is  expected  to  rise  still  further  in 
the  decades  to  come  as  growing  life  expectancy  and  a decline  in fertility  contribute  to 
a double  ageing  process  in Germany. 
Demographic  trends  are  not,  however,  the  only  source  of  increased  pressure 
on  the  financing  of  the  pension  system.  They  are  compounded  by  labour  market 
pressures.  All  major  OECD  countries  have  experienced  a  strong  decline  in  labour 
supply  by  the  elderly  but  the  German  participation  rate  for  older  people  is  now 
among  the  lowest  of  the  major  OECD  countries.  It  is  just  over  half  that  of  the 
comparable  US figure  and  much  lower  than  the  Japanese  rate.  Some  scholars  have 
attributed  these  trends  to  the  structure  of  the  state  pension  system  which  provides 
generous  incentives  to  retire  and,  until  recently,  did  not  decrease  with  age  in  a 
manner  which  was  actuarially  “fair”  (Borsch-Supan,  1991). 
The  low  average  retirement  age  also  reflects  companies’  use  of  inducements 
for  workers  to  retire  early  as  a means  of contracting  their  workforces.  In  recent  years 
early  retirement  due  to  unemployment  has  risen  sharply.  190,000  people  or  21  per 
cent  of  all  those  making  pension  claims  applied  for  early  pensions  in  1994.  In  1995 
the  number  had  increased  to  290,000  with  an  average  retirement  age  of  59.9  years. 
In  that  year  alone  the  cost  to  the  system  of  early  pension  claims  was  DM  69,000  m 
of which  DM  37,OOOm was  paid  by the  statutory  contributory  pension  funds,  27,OOOm 
DM  from  unemployment  insurance,  and  5,OOODM was  paid  by  employers  (EIRR 
272).  The  process  of  German  reunification  has  been  an  important  contributor  to  the 
growing  burden  of early  retirement  in  the  1990s.  As  part  of this  process  the  German 
welfare  system,  including  the  pension  scheme,  was  extended  to  cover  the  whole 
country.  The  restructuring  of  industry  in the  east  has  left  many  older  workers  jobless 
and  claims  for  pensions  in the  east  because  of unemployment  increased  from  373  in 
1992  to  more  than  180,000  in  1995  (EIRR  272). 
Disability  pensions  have  also  grown  in  importance  since  the  definition  of 
disability  was  broadened  in  1969  by  the  German  courts.  In  1995  those  in  receipt  of 
disability  pensions  accounted  for  about  26  per  cent  of  all  pensioners  (Queisser, 
1996,  p.  8).  The  German  system  now  makes  provision  for  occupational  and  general 
disability.  The  former  applies  when  a  person’s  earning  ability  falls  by  more  than  50 
per  cent.  Successful  claimants  under  this  scheme  qualifiy  for  two  thirds  of  the 
benefits  under  a  normal  pension.  General  disability  pension  benefits  are  equivalent 
to  normal  pension  benefits  and  are  paid  to  those  who  are  considered  to  be 
permanently  incapable  of earning  a basic  income  (Queisser,  1996,  p. 8). 
The  importance  of  early  retirement  and  disability  pensions  increases  the 
pressures  on the  pension  system  beyond  what  the  growing  old  age  dependency  ratio 
26 would  imply.  In  1994,  only  29  per  cent  of new  pension  benefits  awarded  were  paid  to 
those  retiring  at  “normal”  retirement  age  (Queisser,  1996,  p.  18).  How  Germany 
deals  with  the  problem  of  supporting  more  and  more  people  in  old  age  will  have 
critical  implications  for  the  sustainability  of  financial  commitment  in  the  German 
economy.  The  growing  concerns  that  have  been  expressed  in  Germany  about  the 
funding  of  pensions  suggest  that  if the  evolution  toward  financial  liquidity  in  Germany 
is  to  get  a  major  push  in  the  near  future  it  will  come  from  changes  in  the  pension 
system. 
4.  Implications  for  the  German  System  of Governance 
The  productive  and  financial  challenges  outlined  above  are,  in  combination,  putting 
significant  pressure  on  the  extant  German  system  of  corporate  governance.  They 
interact  directly  with  each  other  through  the  effect  of  the  process  of  industrial 
rationalisation  on  retirement  obligations  and  through  the  influence  of  the  growing 
strains  in  pension  financing  on  indirect  labour  costs.  But  the  ramifications  of 
Germany’s  investment  and  savings  challenges  go  beyond  these  obvious  effects  to 
challenge  the  foundations  of the  entire  postwar  system  of corporate  governance.  We 
can  gain  some  insight  into  the  possible  implications  for  the  German  system  of 
governance  by  analysing  the  manner  in  which  those  with  substantial  interests  in  the 
allocation  of  German  corporate  revenues  have  responded  to  the  productive  and 
financial  challenges  that  confront  the  German  economy. 
Response  to  the  Productive  Challenges 
The  use  of  early  retirement  as  an  employment  adjustment  measure  continued  into 
the  1980s.  The  restrictions  on  the  use  of  the  early  retirement  scheme  for 
unemployed  workers  were  eased  through  a  lengthening  of  the  maximum  period  for 
receipt  of  unemployment  benefits.  For  workers  aged  54  or  more,  for  example,  the 
maximum  period  had,  by  1987,  been  increased  from  12 months  to thirty-two  months. 
Thus  companies  could  take  advantage  of the  scheme  to  retire  workers  who  were  as 
young  as  57 years  and  four  months  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  p. 27).  By  1984 
6  per  cent  of  new  retirees  qualified  under  the  early  retirement  scheme  for 
unemployed  workers,  up  from  less  than  2  per  cent  in  1974  (Abraham  and 
Houseman,  1993,  p.  27);  in  1994,  21  per  cent  of  all  those  making  pension  claims 
applied  for  early  retirement  (EIRR  272). 
In  1984  the  government  introduced  a  new  scheme  to  permit  early  retirement 
for  private  sector  workers  who  reached  the  age  of 58  during  the  years  1984  to  1988 
or  who  were  already  over  58.  The  employer  was  required  to  pay  the  early  retiree  at 
least  65  per  cent  of  his  previous  gross  income  until  he  became  entitled  to  collect  a 
state  pension  (at  63  years  of  age  for  men  and  60  for  women).  The  proposal  was 
intended  as  a  temporary  measure  to  ease  the  unemployment  situation  (EIRR  120, 
125).  It was  tied  explicitly  to this  objective  by  allowing  the  employer  to clawback  more 
than  half  of  his  payment  to  the  retired  worker  if  the  vacated  job  was  filled  by  a 
registered  unemployed  person.  The  scheme  did  not,  however,  prove  very  popular 
seemingly  because  the  early  retirement  scheme  for  unemployed  persons  was 
financially  more  attractive  to employers  (Abraham  and  Houseman,  1993,  p. 27). 
Early  retirement  schemes  for  the  unemployed  remained  a  relatively  low-cost 
means  for  employers  to  reduce  their  workforces  notwithstanding  the  government’s 
attempts  to  shift  some  of  the  costs  of  these  programmes  from  the  social  security 
funds  to  individual  employers.  Since  1982,  companies  have  been  obliged  to 
reimburse  the  Federal  Labour  Office  for  unemployment  benefits  paid  to  older 
workers  whom  they  have  “fired”  and  who  are  waiting  to  take  early  retirement,  unless 
27 this  would  be  a  threat  to  the  company  in  light  of  its  precarious  economic  situation 
(Bosch,  1990,  p.  36).  Many  companies  using  these  schemes  could,  however,  claim 
an  exemption  on  the  grounds  that  they  were  in  economic  distress  (Abraham  and 
Houseman,  1993,  p. 27). 
Short-time  work  schemes  also  continued  to  be  used  during  this  period  to 
minimise  layoffs;  in  1984,  for  example,  27  per  cent  of the  paid  hours  in  the  German 
steel  industry  were  not  worked  (Houseman,  1991,  p.  36).  Early  retirement  on 
disability  pensions  also  became  more  prevalent  in  response  to  a  broadening  of  the 
eligibility  criteria.  In  the  early  1990s  more  than  40  per  cent  of  retired  blue-collar 
workers  received  a  disability  pension;  their  average  retirement  age  was  about  52 
years  (Schmahl,  1993,  p. 45). 
From  the  early  1980s  however,  there  were  growing  concerns  within  the 
German  labour  movement  about  the  continued  reliance  on  these  schemes.  The  use 
of  early  retirement  as  an  employment  adjustment  measure  was  becoming  more 
difficult  in  industries  in  which  the  workforce  had  been  contracting  for  some  time  like 
steel,  shipbuilding,  coalmining  and  consumer  electronics  because  the  pool  of eligible 
workers  had  diminished.  There  were  also  concerns  that  the  government  was  going 
to  tighten  the  eligibility  requirements  for  these  schemes  and  make  them  more 
expensive  for  individual  companies.  Employers  also  seemed  less  and  less  willing  to 
use  temporary  measures  such  as  short-time  work  because  they  increasingly 
regarded  the  challenges  that  German  enterprises  confronted  as  structural  problems 
(Bosch,  1990,  pp.  35-6).  Moreover,  with  unemployment  on  the  rise  from  the  early 
1980s  it was  clear  that  to  generate  broad-based  prosperity  much  more  was  required 
than  a preservation  of existing  jobs;  new jobs  had  to  be created. 
Led  by  IG  Metall,  the  German  trade  unions  responded  to  this  situation  by 
launching  a  major  campaign  for  shorter  weekly  working  hours;  they  demanded  the 
introduction  of  a  thirty-five  hour  week  without  any  reduction  in  pay.  When 
negotiations  over  working  time  between  the  employers’  organisation  and  the  union 
broke  down,  IG  Metall  struck  for  shorter  hours.  The  1984  strike  was  the  worst  in the 
history  of  the  FRG.  It  lasted  for  nine  weeks  and  involved  about  455,000  workers 
(Baethge  and  Wolf,  1995,  p.  240).4  The  strike  was  concluded  when  the  employers 
agreed  to  reduce  average  working  hours  to  38.5  a week. 
From  the  unions’  perspective,  however,  an  important  unintended 
consequence  of  the  1984  strike  was  the  decentralisation  of  negotiations  over  the 
allocation  of  working  time  to  the  plant  level;’  in  return  for  shorter  hours  employers 
were  allowed  to  meet  the  38.5  hour  target  only  for  the  average  worker  in  an 
enterprise.  The  growing  importance  of  works  councils  in  negotiating  working  time 
was  complementary  to  a  more  general  increase  in  the  relative  importance  of  the 
works  council  in  the  bargaining  process  induced  by  the  ongoing  reorganisation  of 
German  enterprises  (Katz,  1993). 
The  Works  Constitution  Act  of  1972  gave  works  councils  information,  but  not 
codetermination,  rights  with  respect  to  rationalisation  measures  undertaken  by 
employers.  The  councils  could,  however,  use  their  codetermination  rights  in  other 
areas  to  exert  an  indirect  influence  on  the  process  of  technological  change  (Muller- 
Jentsch,  1995;  Thelen,  1991,  p.  184).  In  practice,  works  councils  displayed  varying 
capacities  to  deal  with  the  growing  complexity  of  their  tasks  and,  in  particular,  with 
the  process  of  technological  change.  In  many  cases,  worker  representatives’ 
4 58,000  workers  were  officially  on  strike,  147,000  were  locked  out,  and  250,000  were  out  of 
work due  to a lack  of supplies  (Baethge  and  Wolf,  1995,  p. 240). 
5  Another  unintended  consequence  was  the  change  in  regulations  on  social  insurance 
payments  made  during  strikes  which  made  it  much  more  costly  for  a  union  to  take  industrial 
action  (Silvia,  1988). 
28 involvement  was  limited  to  negotiating  with  management  about  plans  that  had 
already  been  developed  for  the  organisation  of  work  (Altmann,  1992,  pp.  368-70, 
377-8).  Works  councils,  especially  in  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  often 
found  themselves  overwhelmed  by  the  increasing  demands  placed  on  their 
capacities  and  resources.  Not  only  did  they  lack  the  basis  on  which  to  resist 
employers’  demands,  they  also  lacked  strong  incentives  because  of  the  concerns 
among  works  councillors  that  such  resistance  would  lead  to  a  loss  of  jobs  for 
themselves  and  the  workers  whom  they  represented  (Muller-Jentsch,  1995) 
German  unions  were  worried  that  the  growing  “plant  egotism”  that  emerged 
in  the  1980s  would  further  segment  the  workforce  and  undermine  union  solidarity. 
Initially,  they  were  on  the  defensive  in these  matters.  The  German  unions  had,  in the 
postwar  decades,  generally  deferred  to  management  on  technological  initiatives.6 
The  humanisation  of  work  movement  in  1970s  sponsored  by  the  SPD  and  the 
government,  was  an  attempt  to  change  this.  Although  it  lost  its  momentum  because 
of declining  government  support  and  employer  resistance,  it did  have  some  influence 
on  the  expectations  of  union  leaders  and  works  councillors  and,  as  a  result,  on  the 
issues  that  they  were  prepared  to address  in negotiations  with  management  (Turner, 
1991).  In  general,  however,  to  the  extent  that  the  unions  had  attempted  to  shift  the 
bargaining  terrain  from  bread  and  butter  concerns  like  wages  to  more  qualitative 
issues  such  as  work  design  they  had  limited  success.  Even  when  they  succeeded  in 
writing  in  provisions  in  collective  bargaining  agreements,  they  took  the  form  of 
minimum  standards  that  were  then  supplemented  through  negotiations  at  the  plant 
level  between  management  and  works  councils  (Muller-Jentsch,  1986). 
In the  1980s  the  unions  began  to take  a more  critical  stance  on  technological 
change.  In  its  annual  report  for  1982  IG Metall  made  the  following  statement: 
The  economic  boom  in the  Federal  Republic  in the  first  twenty-five  years  of  its existence  was 
founded  on  a  fundamental  consensus  between  the  unions,  employers,  and  the  government. 
The  unions  did  not  fundamentally  challenge  rationalization  and  new  technology;  through 
their  collective  bargainin  g  and  worker  protection  policy  they  were  able  to  reap  for  their 
members  the  fruits  of  productivity  gains  in  the  form  of  wage  increases,  working  time 
reduction,  and  job  and  health  protection.  Developments  in  recent  years  make  this  social 
consensus  more  and  more  fragile..  . Rationalization  in recent  years  has  been  at the  expense  of 
workers.  in the  growth  of  mass  unemployment  and worsening  working  conditions  (IG  Metall, 
Geschaftsbericht,  1980-82,  p. 413,  quoted  in Thelen,  1991,  p.  193). 
As  unemployment  rose  in the  198Os, such  concerns  increased  and  qualitative  issues 
attracted  more  and  more  attention  in  the  labour  movement.  These  concerns  was 
heightened  by  the  fact  that  plant-level  negotiations  between  employers  and  works 
councils  to  adapt  industry-level  contracts  to  local  conditions  led  to  uneven  benefits 
across  the  workforce  as  skilled  workers  were  kept  on for  longer  hours  at the  expense 
of  shorter  hours  for  the  less  skilled  (Thelen,  1991).  There  were  also  fears  in  the 
labour  movement  that  managerial  technological  initiatives,  or  more  precisely,  their 
organisational  ramifications,  would  undermine  the  basis  for  labour  representation 
(Turner,  1991,  p.  113). 
The  unions  initially  tried  to  influence  the  evolving  interaction  between 
technology  and  organisation  in  an  indirect  way.  They  supported  a “training  offensive” 
to  promote  increased  training  and  retraining  for  workers.  They  also  facilitated  an 
overhaul  of  the  structure  and  content  of  traditional  apprenticeship  programmes  to 
take  account  of  recent  technological  developments  (Baethge  and  Wolf,  1995,  p. 
6 For a history  of IG Metall’s  technology  policy, see Thelen,  1991,  chapter  8,  pp. 180-200. 
29 247).  In  pushing  for  high  levels  of  training  throughout  the  1980s  the  unions  hoped 
that  the  availability  of qualified  workers  would  convince  employers  to  reorganise  work 
in  a  way  that  would  allow  them  to  use  their  skills  (Streeck,  1989).  The  federal 
government  and  the  state  governments  also  increased  their  support  for 
apprenticeship  training  during  this  period.  Combined  with  appeals  by  the  government 
to  take  on  apprentices,  and  an  implicit  threat  to  mandate  such  training  vacancies  by 
law  otherwise,  employers  made  more  training  places  available  (Winkelmann,  1996, 
p. 663);  whereas  the  number  of apprenticeships  available  had  been  5 per  cent  below 
the  demand  for  these  places  in  1984,  by  1989/90  there  was  a surplus  of  11  per  cent 
(Casey,  1991,  p. 206). 
One  example  of the  unions’  more  aggressive  approach  to  training  were  their 
promotion  of employment  plans  to  replace  the  traditional  social  plans.  The  latter  had 
dealt  with  mass  redundancies  in  a way  that  was  “largely  defensive  or  reactive;  they 
do  not  intervene  directly  in  the  mechanisms  of  the  labour  market  in  the  event  of 
redundancies,  but  have  mainly  been  focused  on  promoting  external  mobility,  which 
at  most  cushions  the  negative  effects.”  In  contrast,  employment  plans  were  intended 
“by  means  of training  and  diversification  measures,  to  act  on  the  ‘root  of the  evil’  and 
remove  the  need  for  redundancies”  (Bosch,  p.  37).  In  practice,  these  plans  were  to 
prove  far  less  successful  than  their  originators  had  hoped,  primarily  because  of  an 
absence  of serious  employer  commitment  (Bosch,  1990;  Thelen,  1991,  p.  139  ). 
More  general  problems  for  the  unions’  training  initiatives  also  emerged.  The 
ongoing  changes  in  production  technologies  and  the  difficulties  for the  dual  system  to 
keep  abreast  of  them,  as  evidenced  by  shortages  of  production  workers  with 
requisite  computer  skills,  meant  that  investments  in  further  training  have  become 
increasingly  important  as  the  basis  for  the  competitive  advantage  of  German 
enterprises  (Mahnkopf,  1991,  p. 68).  In contrast  to  initial  vocational  training,  which  is 
heavily  regulated  and  relies  on  extensive  worker  involvement  through  unions’  role  in 
governing  the  system  and  works  councils  participation  in  the  implementation  of 
training  within  enterprises,  further  training  is  almost  entirely  at  the  discretion  of 
employers.  The  trend  toward  increased  further  training  means  that: 
. ..the  public  control  of  initial  training  is  losing  its  formative  function  for  the  occupational 
biography  of  the  participants.  In the  future.  further  training  measures  organized  at plant  level, 
i.e.  by private  economic  interest,  will  decide  the  distribution  of  social  status,  incomes,  social 
privileges  and  social  recognition.  Thus.  private  firms  can  determine,  on  the  basis  of 
profitability  considerations,  which  groups  of  employees  will  receive  additional  qualifications 
and  who  must  obtain  them  during  or  outside  working  hours  by  way  of  a  ‘voluntary’ 
commitment  (Mahnkopf.  199 1, p. 77). 
These  trends  posed  a  formidable  challenge  to  the  unions’  “skill-oriented” 
strategies  (Mahnkopf,  1991).  To  be  in  a  position  to  do  more  than  merely  ratify 
managerial  decisions  about  investments  in  skill  formation,  they  had  to  go  beyond 
their  traditional  channels  of  representation.  As  the  1980s  unfolded  the  unions 
campaigned  for  a  more  direct  role  for  labour  in  governing  the  evolving  interaction 
between  organisation  and  technology  in  German  workplaces.  In  1984  the  DGB 
launched  a  “Codetermination  Initiative”  which  had  as  its  goal  the  direct  participation 
of  employees  in  the  design  of  their  work  in  a  humane  manner  (Altmann,  p.  378; 
Fricke,  1986).  IG  Metall  took  the  lead  in formulating  a position  on  labour  participation 
in  decisions  about  the  development  and  utilisation  of  technology.  It  organises  the 
automobile,  steel,  electronics  and  machinery  industries,  and  is  Germany’s  most 
powerful  union.  Its  activities  have  tended  to  set  the  pattern  for  German  labour  at 
large.  In  1984  it established  an  action  programme  on  “Work  and  Technology”. 
30 IG  Metall’s  strategy  emphasised  the  importance  of  local  involvement,  and  it 
relied  heavily  dependent  for  its  implementation  on  the  cooperation  of works  councils. 
The  role  of  the  union  was  seen  as  providing  works  councillors  with  training  and 
materials  on  issues  relevant  to  technological  change  based  on  real-world 
experiences  in  selected  model  plants.  The  programme  was  also  designed  to  educate 
works  councils  about  the  range  of  economically  viable  forms  of work  organisation  to 
encourage  them  to  take  a  more  proactive  stance  on  these  issues  with  employers. 
By the  late  198Os,  IG  Metall  had  developed  a coherent  and  practicable  vision  of work 
organisation  called  Gruppenarbeit  or  “group  work”  (Thelen,  1991,  chap.  8;  Turner, 
1991). 
These  initiatives  met  with  some  limited  success  in  the  late  1980s  but  in 
general  during  the  1980s  the  majority  of  employers  displayed  little  interest  in  group 
work  and  were  resistant  to  extending  workers’  codetermination  rights  over  the 
development  and  utilisation  of technology.  In  1989  when  the  Works  Constitution  Act 
was  amended  to  specify  more  clearly  the  consultation  and  information  rights  of 
workers  with  respect  to  the  introduction  of  new  technology,  the  main  employers’ 
organisation,  the  BDA,  complained  that  West  German  works  councils  already  had 
more  rights  to  information,  consultation,  and  codetermination  than  anywhere  else  in 
the  world  and  to  extend  them  would  interfere  unduly  with  management  decision- 
making.  The  amendment  did  not,  however,  provide  workers  with  codetermination 
rights  over  the  introduction  of  new  technology  and  for  that  reason  was  criticised  by 
the  unions. 
One  can  certainly  find  examples  of  German  companies  that  took  an 
“anthropocentric”  approach  to  technological  change  during  the  1980s  but  the 
predominant  approach  during  this  period  seems  to  have  been  a  technocentric  one 
(Altmann,  1992,  p.  367;  Altmann  et  al,  1992).  The  main  objective  of  restructuring 
efforts  in  German  companies  during  the  1980s  was  the  development  of  factory 
automation.  By  the  end  of the  decade  a widespread  diffusion  of the  components  of 
computer  integrated  manufacturing  systems  had  occurred  in  German  enterprises 
although  they  had  not  been  integrated  into  anything  approaching  the  technocratic 
dream  of a “factory  of the  future”  (K6hler  and  Schmierl,  1992;  Jijrgens  et al,  1993). 
The  appetite  of  German  employers  for  technological  rather  than 
organisational  strategies  to  deal  with  the  Japanese  competitive  threat  is  reminiscent 
of  the  responses  of  leading  American  managers  in  the  1980s.  Arguably,  German 
managers,  who  are  much  more  likely  than  their  American  counterparts  to  be 
technically  trained,  were  even  more  likely  to  try  to  confront  organisational  challenges 
with  technological  “solutions”.  The  common  technology  fetish  among  German 
managers  was  also  reflected  in  the  popularity  of  “technology-based”  diversification 
strategies  during  this  period.  The  attempt  by  Daimler-Benz  to  become  an  “integrated 
technology  concern”  by  diversifying  its  operations  into  aerospace,  aircraft  and  other 
sectors  that  were  deemed  to  be  “technologically  related”  to  its traditional  businesses 
in  automobiles  and  trucks  is  a  well-known  example  and  it  bears  a  striking 
resemblance  to  the  strategy  pursued  by  GM  under  Roger  Smith  around  the  same 
time.  But  Daimler-Benz  was  only  one  among  a  number  of  German  companies  that 
tried  this  route.  The  steel  producers  --  Mannesmann,  Thyssen  and  Krupp  --  were 
among  those  who  found  the  “Technologie-Konzerne”  model  attractive  (Herrigel, 
1995,  pp.  248-251). 
In  addition  to  their  interest  in  technology  as  a  competitive  solution,  German 
employers  also  displayed  increasing  concerns  about  the  costs  of  production,  and,  in 
particular,  the  labour  costs  associated  with  doing  business  in Germany  as  evidenced 
by  the  escalation  of  the  perennial  debate  about  lndustriestandorf  De&s&/and  or 
“Germany  as  an  industrial  location”.  German  employers  claimed  that  the  high  wages, 
31 shorter  working  hours,  tight  labour  market  regulations  and  high  taxes  that  prevailed 
in  Germany  had  undermined  the  international  competitive  position  of  German 
industry.  The  unions  have  traditionally  countered  the  employers’  arguments  by 
pointing  to  the  highly  skilled  German  workforce  and  the  export  market  success  of 
German  industry.  In  1993,  however,  the  Standort  debate  became  unprecedently 
hostile  as  Germany  entered  its worst  recession  in  postwar  history. 
Employers  argued  that  the  deterioration  in  the  economic  performance  of 
German  industry  was  the  result  of an  underlying  “cost  crisis”  facing  German  industry. 
They  warned  that  German  companies  would  be forced  to  relocate  production  abroad 
if drastic  action  was  not  taken.  Their  primary  concern  was  with  labour  costs.  In  the 
words  of  Hans-Peter  Stihl,  chairman  of  the  German  Chambers  of  Commerce,  and 
the  owner  of  Andreas  Stihl,  a  chainsaw  manufacturer  near  Stuttgart:  “We  have  a 
cost  crisis  that  has  caused  something  of a structural  crisis.  Either  German  unions  will 
accept  substantial  reductions  in  incomes  and  wages  or  we  will  lose  more  jobs.  We 
also  have  the  possibility  of moving  more  jobs  abroad  (NYT,  February  13,  1996).” 
The  recent  trends  in  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  into  and  out  of  Germany 
have  been  taken  as  evidence  by  many  commentators  that  companies  have  been 
voting  with  their  feet  on  the  declining  attractiveness  of  Germany  as  a  place  to  do 
business.  FDI  by  German  companies  has  been  rising  rapidly  since  the  1980s;  from 
1984  to  1995  the  direct  investment  of German  enterprises  abroad  rose  at an  average 
annual  rate  of  17.5  per  cent  from  US%0  billion  to  $300  billion.  Inward  FDI,  according 
to the  German  balance  of payments,  was  much  lower;  during  the  period  from  1984  to 
1995  total  inward  investment  amounted  to  just  over  US$36  billion  (Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  August  1997,  pp.  64,  71). 
It  is,  however,  unlikely  that  the  cost  of  German  labour  is  the  main  reason  for 
these  trends  in  FDI.’  The  regional  distribution  of  the  stock  of  German  enterprises’ 
FDI,  and,  in  particular,  the  fact  that  it  is  almost  identical  to  that  of  German  exports, 
suggests  that  German  companies  are  investing  abroad  to  secure  market  access. 
That  is,  in  fact,  what  has  been  reported  as  the  main  reason  for  investing  abroad  in 
surveys  of  German  employers  (Deutsche  Bundesbank,  August  1997,  p.  66,  fn.  5). 
Despite  increases  in  the  US  and  South  East  Asia,  German  FDI  continues  to  be 
heavily  concentrated  in European  countries  which  have  somewhat  lower  labour  costs 
than  in  Germany  but  can  hardly  be  classified  as  low-wage  countries  (Heiduk  and 
Hodges,  1992). 
The  changing  of  the  guard  in  Eastern  Europe  has,  however,  created  lower- 
wage  location  possibilities  closer  to  home  for  German  enterprises  than  heretofore. 
However,  in  1995  Germany’s  direct  investment  in  central  and  eastern  European 
countries  amounted  to  DM  4.2  billion  which,  although  increasing,  constitutes  just 
over  7 per  cent  of German  FDI  as  a whole  and  is also  being  driven  by  market  access 
considerations.  The  expansion  of  trade  with  these  countries  has  already  provided 
German-based  exporters  with  lucrative  export  opportunities  especially  in  mechanical 
and  engineering  products,  road  vehicles,  and  chemical  products  (Deutsche 
Bundesbank  Monthly  Report,  July  1996). 
German  companies  have  also  been  investing  abroad  to  gain  access  to 
foreign  research  capabilities.  This  is  particularly  true  for  the  German  chemicals 
industry,  which  accounts  for  a  substantial  proportion  of  Germany’s  foreign  direct 
investment  (Ddrrenbacher  and  Wortmann,  1991).  Moreover,  the  ongoing  process  of 
European  integration  has  convinced  many  German  companies,  and  in  particular 
financial  enterprises  like  banks  and  insurance  companies,  of the  value  of  acquisition 
strategies  designed  to  build  up  a pan-European  presence. 
’ For an expression  of this view by Heinrich von Pierer, the chairman  of Siemens. see 
Financial  Times,  16 February  1996, p. 17. 
32 The  sustained  appreciation  of  the  DM  has  made  all  of  these  FDI  strategies 
relatively  cheap  for  German  enterprises.  The  strength  of the  DM  is  undoubtedly  also 
part  of  the  explanation  for  the  relatively  low  level  of  inward  FDI.  Statistical 
discrepancies  are  another.  In  contrast  to  the  figure  of  US$36  billion  reported  in  the 
German  balance  of  payments  as  the  cumulative  total  of  direct  investment  imports  in 
1984-95,  a  comparable  figure  of  US$118.9  billion  is  reported  by  the  balance  of 
payments  of  investor  countries.  On  the  basis  of  these  revised  figures,  as  the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  put  it,  “Germany’s  position  as  a  recipient  country  of 
international  direct  investment  appears  in  a  much  more  favourable  light”  (Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  August  1997,  p. 72;  Financial  Times,  14 July  1997,  p. 7). 
On  balance  there  is  little  support  in the  evidence  on  foreign  direct  investment 
that  high  costs  have  been  driving  companies  out  of,  or  keeping  them  away  from, 
Germany.  Whatever  the  real  reasons  for  their  international  strategies,  however, 
many  German  employers  used  the  fact  of a deficit  in  FDI  and  other  arguments  about 
declining  German  cost  competitiveness  to take  a much  harder  line  on  labour  costs  at 
home.  In  December  1993,  Gesamtmetall,  the  metalworking  employers’  association, 
took  the  unprecedented  action  of cancelling  their  collective  agreement  with  IG  Metall. 
The  action  was  largely  symbolic  because  the  agreement  lasted  only  until  the  end  of 
1993  but  it  was  widely  interpreted  as  a  signal  of  a  shift  by  employers  to  a  more 
aggressive  stance  toward  labour  (Baethge  and  Oberbeck,  1995). 
Employers  have  railed  against  collectively  bargained  wage  increases  and 
called  instead  for  plant-level  agreements.  There  had,  in  fact,  already  been  a  strong 
trend  in  that  direction  before  the  early  1990s  (Katz,  1993),  but  it  rapidly  gained 
momentum  when  the  recession  began.  By  1994,  for  example,  in  the  metalworking 
industry  which  was  badly  hit,  pay  determined  at  the  plant  rather  than  the  industry 
level  had  become  widespread.  In  general,  the  recession  has  prompted  a  process  of 
concession  bargaining  at  the  plant  or  company  level  (Sadowski,  Schneider  and 
Wagner,  1994,  p.  534).  Standortsicherungs  (location  guaranteeing)  agreements 
have  become  widespread  at the  plant  and  enterprise  levels;  their  common  feature  is 
the  concession  of  a reduction  in  labour  costs  by  the  works  council  or  union  in  return 
for  a  guarantee  of  employment  security.  These  agreements  differ  substantially, 
however,  with  respect  to  their  details.  Some  are  focussed  primarily  on  cost  cutting; 
others  include  more  proactive  measures  to  improve  competitiveness  (Jurgens, 
1997).  The  Standorfsicherungs  agreements  have  not,  however,  stopped  the 
unprecedented  wave  of  corporate  layoffs  that  began  in  Germany  in  1991  and  in 
some  cases  have  included  measures  to  facilitate  that  process  in  a  “socially 
acceptable”  manner  through,  for  example,  the  use  of  early  retirement  schemes 
(Jurgens,  1997).  The  Kiel  Institute  estimated  that  1.3  million  jobs,  or  15  per  cent  of 
Germany’s  manufacturing  employment,  were  lost  in  the  period  from  1991  to  1996 
(NYT,  July  13,  1996). 
Employers  claim  that  they  cannot  afford  to  keep  high-cost  German  workers 
employed  given  the  intense  competition  that  they  face  on  international  product 
markets.  According  to  a survey  conducted  by the  lnstitut  der  deutschen  Wirtschaft  of 
average  hourly  labour  costs  in  manufacturing  in the  world’s  leading  economies,  West 
Germany  is  leading  the  pack.  Wage  increases,  however,  play  a  smaller  role  in 
Germany’s  relative  position  than  one  would  imagine  from  employers’  rhetoric.  During 
the  period  from  1970  to  1994,  the  country  with  the  lowest  wage  increases  was  the 
US;  Switzerland  and  Germany  were  the  countries  with  the  second  lowest  growth  of 
pay!  One  reason  for  the  growth  in  hourly  labour  costs  was  a  rise  in  indirect  labour 
costs,  mostly  due  to  increased  social  security  contributions;  in  absolute  terms  West 
Germany  had  the  highest  indirect  costs  of  all  of  the  countries  surveyed.  But  the 
relative  increase  was  also  substantially  attributable  to the  appreciation  in the  value  of 
33 the  DM  rather  than  an  increase  in  domestic  costs  as  such  (EIRR,  259,  August  1995, 
PP. 13). 
In  and  of  themselves  international  labour  cost  comparisons  do  not  say 
anything  definitive  about  the  competitiveness  of  a  country,  a  region,  or  a  nation. 
German  companies  have  in  the  past  paid  relatively  high  wages  and  still  managed  to 
be  competitive  on  international  markets.  Bringing  productivity  into  the  picture  to 
calculate  unit  labour  costs  is  one  way  of  getting  a  more  accurate  reading  of 
competitiveness.  A  1993  report  by  the  DIW  research  institute  contended  that  only 
twice  in  the  last  25  years  --  in  1970-I  and  in  1992  --  did  unit  labour  costs  rise  faster 
than  the  average  for  other  industrialised  countries.  For  the  remainder  of that  period, 
the  increase  in  German  unit  labour  costs  was  below  that  of  its  competitors  (EIRR 
241).  Employers,  in  contrast,  argue  that  productivity  no  longer  compensates  for  high 
German  labour  costs.  According  to  a survey  by  the  employers’  IW  research  institute 
in  the  period  1985-l  992,  unit  labour  costs  --  calculated  on  the  basis  of  exchange 
rates  against  the  DM  --  rose  by  30.2%  in  Germany,  or  more  rapidly  than  in  almost 
any  other  of  the  major  trading  nations  included  in  the  survey.  The  IW  did 
acknowledge  that  the  relative  increase  had  more  to  do  with  the  growing  strength  of 
the  DM  than  with  an  increase  in  domestic  costs  but,  whatever  the  reason,  it argued 
that  the  most  important  fact  is that  Germany  had  the  highest  unit  labour  costs  of  any 
major  industrial  nation  (EIRR  241). 
Studies  conducted  at  the  industry  level  generally  support  the  view  that  the 
symptom  of the  competitive  challenge  facing  German  industry  is found  in  productivity 
rather  than  cost  differences.  In  the  automobile  industry,  for  example,  average  gross 
value  added  per  employee  was  92,000  DM  per  year  in  Germany  during  the  period 
from  1981  to  1990  compared  with  131,000  DM  in  Japan  (Roth,  1997,  p.  123).  As 
Table  4  above  shows,  similar  differentials  can  be  seen  in  the  machine  tool  industry. 
Productivity  differences  do  not  however  explain  competitive  problems;  they  are 
symptoms  of  it.  Moreover,  productivity  is  a  useful  concept  in  understanding 
competitiveness  only  when  it  is  studied  over  the  long  term.  Once  companies  move 
away  from  traditional  ways  of  doing  business,  once  they  start  transforming 
technologies  and  organisations,  productivity  measures  become  muddy,  and 
sometimes  quite  inaccurate,  measures  of  potential  competitive  strength.  If 
companies  are  pursuing  developmental  strategies,  short-term  productivity  generally 
has  to  be  sacrificed  in  the  expectation  of  achieving  long-term  gains.  Thus  if 
productivity  measures  look  good  in  the  short  term  that  can  be  consistent  with,  and 
even  symptomatic  of,  a failure  to undertake  innovative  strategies. 
To  really  get  at  the  nature  of  the  competitive  challenges  that  German 
enterprises  confront,  necessitates  studying  the  bases  on  which  companies  compete 
with  each  other  on  international  product  markets.  Shorter  working  hours  in  Germany 
compared  with  Japan  explain  some  of the  productivity  differences  between  German 
and  Japanese  companies  (Roth,  p.  124;  Finegold  et  al,  1994,  p.23).  But  what  all  of 
the  detailed  comparative  analyses  of  international  competition  show  is  that  the  key 
competitive  challenge  facing  German  industry  is  an  organisational  one.  Thus, 
although  wage  restraint  and  increased  working  hours  may  well  be  elements  of  a 
creative  response  by  German  enterprises  to  this  challenge,  they  will  not  be  enough 
to  lay  the  foundations  for  sustainable  prosperity  in the  German  economy. 
It  is  an  open  question  whether  those  with  powerful  interests  in  the  extant 
system  of  governance  have  the  requisite  abilities  and  incentives  to  bring  about 
organisational  transformation  in  the  German  economy.  As  Herrigel  points  out,  such 
change  would  have  to  involve  “the  collective  reconsideration  of  the  institutional 
mechanisms  that  both  define  and  regulation  relations  between  all  parties  in  labour 
and  product  markets  (Herrigel,  1996,  p. 35)“.  Certainly  there  is  no  consensus  on  how 
34 organised  labour  should  proceed.  The  stronger  unions,  like  IG  Metall,  have  always 
expressed  concerns  that,  left  to  their  own  devices,  works  councils  would  contribute 
to  a segmentation  of the  workforce  by  consolidating  the  interests  of  insiders.  But  the 
unions  face  a similar  dilemma  themselves.  The  question  that  Norbert  Altmann  asked 
with  respect  to  the  unions’  technology  initiatives  have  more  general  relevance:  “Are 
the  unions  in  danger  of  increasing  the  process  of  polarisation  by  fighting  for  a 
humane  design  of  work  which  primarily  benefits  those  already  employed  (Altmann, 
1992,  p.  384)?”  Birgit  Mahnkopf  casts  the  current  situation  facing  the  unions  in 
pessimistic  terms.  On  the  one  hand,  they  run  the  risk  of being  denounced  as  barriers 
to  progress  if they  obstruct  employer  strategies.  On  the  other  hand,  a “skill-oriented” 
modernisation  strategy”  risks  strengthening  social  inequalities  further  by  entering  into 
“an  ideological  alliance  between  the  ‘hard-working’  and  ‘successful’  against  the 
‘indolent’  and  ‘incapable’  (Mahnkopf,  1991,  p. 77).”  As  unemployment  grows  and  cuts 
into  union  membership,  however,  even  the  most  powerful  unions  are  displaying  a 
defensive  pragmatism  in response  to employer  strategies. 
German  employers  have  certainly  shown  that  they  are  willing  to  tackle  what 
they  consider  to  be  the  excessive  wages  and  insufficent  working  hours  of  German 
workers  even  when  it  involves  confrontation  with  the  unions  as  happened,  for 
example,  in  1996  over  the  issue  of  sick  pay.  What  is  not  clear,  however,  is  whether 
they  have  the  abilities  and  incentives  to  recognise  and  confront  the  organisational 
foundations  of  German  industry’s  competitive  problems.  Indeed,  to  focus  on 
technology  and  labour  costs,  as  many  German  managers  have  been  wont  to  do,  is 
to  obscure  the  nature  of the  problem. 
In  recent  years,  however,  there  seems  to  have  been  growing  recognition 
among  employers  of  the  need  for  organisational  transformation.  In  the  automobile 
industry,  in  particular,  “the  lean  production  revolution”  which  got  underway  in 
Germany  in  1991  forced  a  recognition  of the  importance  of  organisational  issues  to 
enterprise  performance.  Progress  in  confronting  these  issues  has,  however,  been 
patchy.  Jijrgens  recently  gave  the  following  evaluation  of the  progress  of  teamwork 
in the  automobile  industry: 
In  the  more  than  five  years  since  the  adoption  of  lean  production  by  German  companies. 
major  differences  in  the  degree  of  emphasis  on  teamwork  have  become  evident.  Some 
manufacturers  have  achieved  almost  full  integration  of  their  workforces  into  teams,  while 
others..  are  in  a  pilot  stage.  The  differences  cannot  be  explained  by  blockades  and 
controversies  in  the  industrial  relations  arena,  however.  Rather,  operations  managers  often 
hesitate  to  introduce  far-reaching  changes,  while  top-level  managers  have  other  priorities 
(Jiirgens  1997. p.  I 11). 
If  the  German  system  of  governance  faced  only  productive  challenges, 
serious  as  they  are,  one  could  have  some  confidence  that  consensus  could  be 
achieved  to  promote  the  social  transformation  necessary  to  regenerate  the 
organisational  foundations  of  innovation  in  German  enterprises.  The  confluence  of 
productive  and  financial  challenges,  however,  makes  the  achievement  of  this 
outcome  much  less  likely.  It  provides  the  scope  for  those  with  interests  in  financial 
liquidity  to  use  their  growing  power  to  live  off  what  has  been  accumulated  in  the 
productive  economy  in  the  past  rather  than  to  restrain  their  claims  to  permit  the 
allocation  of resources  to  develop  the  organisations  required  to  rebuild  an  innovative 
dynamic  in the  German  economy. 
35 Responses  to the  Financial  Challenges 
To  date  the  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  government  to  improve  the  funding  situation 
in  the  state  pension  scheme  have  focussed  on  making  adjustments  within  the 
framework  of the  postwar  pension  system.  The  most  important  legislative  initiative  to 
date  is the  Pension  Reform  Act  of  1989  (which  took  effect  in  1992).  It was  motivated 
by  the  expectation,  based  primarily  on  projections  of  demographic  ageing,  that 
contribution  rates  would  have  to  rise  to  unsustainable  levels  in  the  early  decades  of 
the  next  century  to  support  the  extant  pension  system.  The  act  was  intended  to 
make  early  retirement  more  difficult  in the  future.  The  statutory  retirement  age  was  to 
be  raised  to  65  by  2001.  If workers  wished  to  retire  earlier  they  would  have  to  take  a 
reduction  in  their  pension  of  3.5  per  cent  per  annum  (compared  with  a  reduction  of 
6.6  per  cent  per  annum  in  the  US)  but  from  2001  the  earliest  age  at  which  they  can 
retire  will  be  set  at  62  years.  In  another  attempt  to  reduce  pension  obligations,  the 
act  also  mandated  that  pension  benefits  would  be  adjusted  on  the  basis  of  average 
net  earnings  rather  than  average  gross  earnings  as  they  were  in  the  past.  It  also 
increased  the  federal  grant  to  the  pension  system  to  take  some  pressure  off  the 
contribution  rate  necessary  to  support  a  given  level  of  benefits.  Finally,  a  partial 
pension  scheme  was  also  introduced  which  allows  certain  proportions  of  the  full 
statutory  pension  to  be  combined  with  earnings  from  employment  up  to  certain 
specified  limits  (Schmahl,  1993). 
The  effectiveness  of  the  1992  reform  of the  pension  system  was  dependent 
on  enterprises’  employment  strategies  and  conditions  in  the  labour  market  more 
generally.  In  the  absence  of a serious  commitment  to  keep  older  workers  employed, 
the  pressures  on  early  retirement  could  not  be  controlled.  The  major  workforce 
reductions  that  began  in  1992  and  continued  unabated  until  the  time  of  writing,  as 
well  as  the  ongoing  process  of  restructuring  in  East  Germany,  increased  the 
demands  for  pension  benefits  as  claims  for  early  retirement  due  to  unemployment 
continued  to  rise.  Rising  unemployment  also  reduced  the  number  of  contributors  to 
the  system.  Notwithstanding  the  reform,  therefore,  the  contribution  rate  thus  had  to 
be  increased  to  make  up the  shortfall. 
It  was  in  this  context  that  new  legislation,  to  deal  explicitly  with  early 
retirement,  was  introduced  in  August  1996.  The  law  aimed  to  raise  the  minimum 
early  retirement  age  for  men  in  steps  from  60  to  63  over  the  period  from  1997  to 
1999.  Employees  who  want  to  retire  before  63  years  of  age  will  have  to  accept  an 
annual  cut  of 6.3  per  cent  in their  pension  for  every  year  taken  before  that  age.  Men 
aged  55  years  and  more  by  February  1996  were  exempted  from  the  provisions  of 
law  as were  women,  employees  with  disabilities,  and  employees  in the  iron  and  steel 
industry  under  certain  circumstances.  The  reform  also  introduced  measures  to 
encourage  employees  over  the  age  of  55  to  work  on  a  part-time  basis  prior  to 
retirement;  workers  can  halve  their  working  hours  and  receive  70  per  cent  of  their 
incomes.  Employers  are  required  to  pay  only  for  the  hours  worked;  the 
unemployment  insurance  fund  makes  up the  difference  if the  employer  hires  another 
employee  to work  the  half job  made  available  (EIRR  272). 
The  contribution  rate  to  finance  the  statutory  pension  scheme  was  increased 
again  in  1997  and  the  government  presented  a draft  for  a  new  Pension  Reform  Bill 
which  was  originally  slated  for  1999  but  is  now  being  considered  for  introduction  in 
1998.  The  draft  includes  a  proposal  to  eliminate  the  early  retirement  pension  for 
unemployed  workers  and  for  women  in  2012.  Instead,  the  right  to  early  retirement 
will  only  be  granted  to  those  who  have  paid  contributions  for  at  least  35  years,  the 
option  will  only  be  available  from  the  age  of  62,  and  a  reduction  in  pension  benefits 
of  3.6  per  annum  will  have  to  be  borne  by  the  retiree.  The  draft  also  proposes  a 
reduction  in  the  contribution  rate  by  increasing  the  Federal  grant  and  a  substantial 
36 tightening  of  the  eligibility  requirements  for  disability  pensions  (Deutsche 
Bundesbank  Monthly  Report,  pp. 42-46). 
The  trend  of  pension  reform  in  Germany  is  clearly  toward  harsher  measures 
but  as  yet  the  changes  do  not  consitute  a  major  rethinking  of  the  pension  system, 
Proposals  for  a fundamental  overhaul  of the  German  pension  system  -- for  example, 
the  replacement  of  the  existing  statutory  pensions  by  a  flat-rate  minimum  pension 
and/  or  a  change  from  the  pay-as-you  go  system  to  a  funded  pension  scheme  -- 
were  mooted  in  Germany  around  the  time  of  the  legislative  reform.  They  were, 
however,  put  forward  primarily  by  academics  and  were  not  taken  seriously  by 
mainstream  parties  in  the  political  debate.  All  of  the  political  parties,  except  the 
Green  Party,  supported  the  reform,  as  did  the  trade  union  and  employer 
organisations  (Schmahl,  1993,  p. 42). 
The  pressures  are,  however,  increasing  not  so  much  because  of  the 
financing  problems  per  se,  although  these  are  serious  and  worsening,  but  also 
because  of the  direct  relationship  between  these  problems  and  the  Standort  debate. 
The  government  is  certainly  concerned  about  the  Standort  issue;  in  September  1993 
it  published  a  report  called  “Securing  Germany’s  future  as  an  economic  base”  in 
which  Chancellor  Kohl  warned  of  the  consequences  of  rising  labour  costs,  falling 
working  hours,  and  longer  holiday  entitlement  on  Germany’s  international 
competitiveness  (EIRR  241).  Since  1982,  Kohl’s  governments  have  undertaken 
various  legislative  initiatives,  such  as  the  Employment  Promotion  Act  of  1985,  in  a 
concerted  attempt  to  deregulate  the  labour  market.  On  issues  of labour  market  policy 
in general,  the  government  has  lined  up with  employers. 
The  politics  of  pensions  and  the  welfare  state  as  a  whole  are,  however, 
potentially  even  more  explosive  than  these  labour  market  reforms  have  been.  To 
pursue  a  political  agenda  to  rollback  the  welfare  state  in  Germany  would  likely  be 
political  dynamite,  especially  in  the  year  before  an  election.  But  if  unemployment 
continues  to  rise,  and  if the  financing  situation  in  the  pension  scheme  continues  to 
deteriorate,  the  hand  of this  government  or  its  successor  may  be  forced  to  introduce 
more  radical  measures.  It  is  not  just  conservative  elements  in  German  society  that 
are  calling  for  a  rethinking  of the  welfare  state  in  general  and  pensions  in  particular. 
The  Greens  have  also  made  it a central  element  in their  political  programme. 
The  likelihood  of  radical  measures  being  introduced  is  being  given  an  added 
impetus  by  policy  initiatives  in  the  European  Union.  In  its  attempts  to  promote  the 
mobility  of  capital  and  labour  across  European  borders,  the  EU  has  identified 
retirement  provision  as  one  of  the  key  obstacles  to  achieving  this  objective 
(Mortenson,  1992,  p.  6).  With  a  view  to  removing  this  obstacle,  it  has  been 
developing  policy  proposals  that,  if  introduced,  will  make  private  pension  provision 
much  more  attractive  than  heretofore  as  is  evidenced  by  the  recent  proposal  for  an 
EU  pensions  directive.  It was  unsuccessful  but  it  seems  only  a  matter  of  time  until 
some  version  of  it  is  passed  given  the  relatively  neoliberal  climate  on  issues  of 
banking  and  finance  in the  EU. 
Whatever  their  source,  significant  changes  in  the  German  pension  system 
would  undoubtedly  entail  some  move  to  funding  and/  or  increased  private  pension 
provision,  whatever  the  merits  of these  strategies  for  equitable  retirement  provision. 
The  effects  for  the  financial  system,  and  in  particular  for  pressures  for  financial 
liquidity,  could  be  enormous.  According  to  Josef  Wertschulte,  a  director  of 
Bayerische  Hypotheken-  und  Wechsel-Bank,  “[plension  funds  could  total  between 
DMI  ,600  bn  and  DM2,OOObn  in  10  years  if the  right  legal  and  tax  conditions  were 
created.  This  would  double  the  size  of  the  present  equity  market  (Financial  Times, 
February  17,  1997,  p.20).” 
37 There  are  key  players  in  the  German  economy  who  have  significant 
incentives  to  support  these  pressures  for  greater  financial  liquidity.  Of  particular 
importance  are  the  interests  of  major  financial  enterprises  operating  in  Germany.  All 
three  sectors  of  the  banking  industry  --  the  savings  banks,  the  cooperative  banks, 
and  the  private  banks  (incl.  the  big  banks)  --  have  been  active  participants  in  “the 
battle  over  the  piggy  bank”  that  has  been  underway  in  Germany  in  recent  decades 
(Oberbeck  and  Baethge,  p.  287).  Indeed,  Germany  has  one  of  most  extensive 
banking  networks  in  the  world  and  in  recent  decades  the  competition  among  banks 
has  rapidly  intensified.  By  the  end  of the  1970s  the  major  insurance  companies  had 
also  become  formidable  competitors  for  the  savings  of  German  people.  Competing 
for  savings  has  provided  these  financial  enterprises  with  strong  incentives  to 
promote  liquidity  in the  German  economy. 
Arguably,  the  large  private  banks  --  Deutsche  Bank,  Dresdner  and 
Commerzbank  --  the  alleged  “patient  capitalists”  of  the  German  economy  have 
particularly  strong  incentives  to  support  higher  returns  on  financial  assets.  They  have 
less  to  lose  than  the  savings  and  cooperative  banks  (with  a  combined  total  of  80 
percent  of  savings  deposits)  through  the  disintermediation  that  has  already  and  will 
continue  to  result  from  the  widespread  introduction  of  market-based  savings 
instruments  (Deutsche  Bundesbank,  1991).  Moreover,  with  their  access  to  high- 
income  Germans  through  their  retail  networks,  and  their  experience  in  securities 
markets  at  home  and  abroad,  they  are  well  positioned  to  exploit  the  profit  potential  of 
this  business.  Reflecting  these  incentives  they  have  already  been  very  active  in  the 
introduction  of  these  new  savings  instruments  and  in  attempting  to  promote  an 
“equity  culture”  in  Germany.  A  recent  article  entitled  “From  Savers  to  Investors”  in 
the  Deutsche  Bank  Research  Bulletin  gives  some  sense  of  the  business 
opportunities  that  the  banks  see  if  Germans  can  be  persuaded  to  move  in  the 
direction  of greater  liquidity: 
A  prerequisite  for  the  building  of  a tradition  of  equity  culture  . . .  is the  existence  of  “fertile 
ground”  --  a  change  must  take  place  in  the  mentality  of  private  households.  The  current 
turnover  of  generations  may  be  a  catalyst  for  such  a  change.  Up  to  the  year  2000,  assets 
valued  at approximately  DEM  200  bn will  be transferred  annually  to the  so-called  inheritance 
generation.  It  is the  first  time  in this  century  that  wealth  is being  passed  on  to  a  generation 
which  has  experienced  neither  a  world  war,  nor  hyper  inflation  and  currency  reform,  and 
which  does  not  have  to  slowly  and  painfully  build  up wealth  from  scratch.  The  new  investors 
therefore  tend  to  be  more  open  to  riskier  investments  which  offer  higher  returns,  criteria 
which  are  met  by  stocks  (Deutsche  Bank  Bulletin,  January  9,  1995,  p.  10) 
German  insurance  giants  like  Allianz  have  also  been  eyeing  the  increased 
business  opportunities  in  asset  management  that  would  be  available  to  them  if there 
is  a  greater  trend  toward  financial  liquidity  in  the  German  economy.  Allianz  has 
substantial  holdings  in  other  financial  enterprises  -- for  example,  it owns  22  per  cent 
of  Dresdner  Bank  and  26  per  cent  of  Munich  Re  --  and  so  its  increased  interest  in 
asset  management  will  be  highly  significant  for  the  future  of  the  German  financial 
sector  (Euromoney,  January  1997,  pp. 41-48). 
The  incentives  of these  financial  enterprises  to  stimulate  demands  for  higher 
financial  returns  in  Germany  are  reinforced  by  similar  trends  towards  heightened 
competition  in  other  segments  of  their  business.  In  issuing,  for  example,  Deutsche 
Bank  dominated  the  market  as  the  syndicate  leader  for  new  issues  in  the  postwar 
period.  From  the  early  198Os,  however,  more  banks  won  access  to  the  stock 
exchange  as  dealers,  and  competed  successfully  for  such  a  role  (Deeg,  1991,  p. 
201).  The  intensification  of  competition  in this  segment  of the  banking  business  was 
38 seen  in the  rush  to float  the  shares  of medium-sized  enterprises  during  a boom  in the 
German  stock  market  in  the  late  1980s.  The  boom  was  fuelled  by  the  success  of 
these  companies  and  the  excitement  about  the  prospects  of reunification  for  German 
industry.  So  vigorous  was  the  competition  among  German  financial  institutions  for 
this  initial  public  offering  business  that  when  the  market  slumped  in  the  early  1990s 
and  a  number  of  companies  encountered  substantial  difficulties,  the  banks  were 
charged  with  floating  companies  that  were  not  “borsenfahig”  (ready  for  the  stock 
market)  (Institutional  Investor,  November  1993). 
The  overhaul  of  the  regulatory  framework  of  the  German  financial  markets 
that  has  occurred  in  recent  years  has  facilitated  the  intensification  of  competition  in 
the  German  financial  sector.  These  legal  changes  have  been  largely  supported  by 
the  major  financial  enterprises  and  actively  promoted  by  them  in  certain  spheres.  To 
characterise  these  companies  as  “patient  capitalists”  seems  particularly  misguided  in 
the  1990s.  Indeed,  it  has  arguably  long  been  a  misnomer.  The  big  banks,  for 
example,  have  never  been  shy  about  advancing  their  profit  interests  and  have  done 
well  from  their  postwar  acquiescence  in  a  system  that  provided  German  enterprise 
with  financial  commitment  largely  because  of restrictions  on  competition,  both  among 
savings  instruments  and  in  the  securities  markets.  As  Germans  have  grown 
wealthier  and  competition  for  their  savings  has  intensified,  however,  the  banks 
increasingly  see  their  interests  as  being  better  achieved  by  promoting  financial 
liquidity  rather  than  financial  commitment. 
A  symptom  of  this  change  seems  to  be  the  weakening  of  bank-industry 
linkages  over  the  last  two  decades.  The  private  banking  sector  as  a  whole  has 
reduced  its  seats  on  the  supervisory  boards  of the  100  largest  AGs  from  162  in  1974 
to  104  in  1989.  They  have  also  reduced  their  direct  shareholdings;  the  number  of 
companies  in  which  banks  held  at  least  ten  per  cent  of  the  shares  (directly  or 
indirectly)  fell  from  129  in  1976  to  86  in  1986  and  the  number  on  which  they 
controlled  a blocking  minority  of more  than  25 percent  fell  from  86 to 45  (Deeg,  1991, 
p. 201).  The  big  banks’  involvement  in the  hostile  takeover  bid  launched  by  Krupp  for 
Thyssen  in  March  1997  is  also  suggestive  of a shift  in  their  orientation.  The  head  of 
Krupp,  Gerhard  Cromme,  had  already  made  history  in  1991  as  the  first  German 
businessman  to  successfully  conclude  a  major  hostile  takeover  when  his  company 
bought  out  the  Hoesch  steel  enterprise  (Economist,  March  22,  1997,  p.  80).  As  The 
Economist  described  him,  Cromme  is “much  liked  by western  investment  bankers  in 
Frankfurt,  who  see  him  as  a  champion  of  new-style  Germany,  committed  to 
shareholder  value  and  transparent  accounts  --  as  well  as  a  future  filled  with  juicy 
fees  for  them  (Economist,  November  8,  1997).”  Deutsche  Morgan  Grenfell  and 
Dresdner  Kleinwort  Benson  were  Cromme’s  advisers  and  reputedly  provided  Krupp 
with  a  credit  line  of  DM18  billion  through  their  parent  banks,  Deutsche  Bank  and 
Dresdner  Bank  respectively.  That  the  banks  were  also  involved  with  Thyssen,  not 
least  because  of the  proxy  votes  that  they  hold  in this  widely  held  company,  got  them 
into  some  hot  water.  In  general,  the  bid  was  denounced  by  Thyssen  management, 
the  unions,  and  local  politicians.  Krupp  was  persuaded  to  drop  its  bid  although  the 
companies  agreed  to  merge  their  carbon  steel  businesses.  In  November  1997, 
Thyssen  dropped  its  objections  and  the  two  companies  agreed  to  a friendly  merger 
(Economist,  November  8,  1997,  pp.  69-70;  Der  Spiegel,  48,  1997,  pp.  124-125). 
To  date,  notwithstanding  the  concerted  efforts  by  financial  enterprises  to 
promote  demands  for  higher  yields  among  broad  sections  of the  German  population, 
they  have  had  limited  although  growing  success.  The  stock  market  is  already  highly 
liquid  but  largely  because  of  the  influential  role  played  by  foreign  investors,  some  of 
which  are,  in  fact,  Germans  recycling  their  money  through  international  financial 
markets  to  avoid  domestic  taxes.  The  market  is  not,  however,  very  deep. 
39 Notwithstanding  changes  in  the  structure  of  German  savings  in  recent  decades, 
equity  holdings  as  a percentage  of private  financial  assets  remain  low  in  international 
comparison;  in  the  early  1990s  about  5.4  per  cent  of  Germans  owned  stocks 
compared  with  21 .l  per  cent  in  the  US,  21  per  cent  in  the  UK,  and  16  per  cent  in 
Japan  (Deutsche  Bank  Bulletin,  January  9,  1995,  p.  9).  The  appetite  of  German 
households  for  equities  has,  however,  been  rapidly  increasing  in  recent  years.  The 
proportion  of  Germans  owning  shares  increased  to  7.6  per  cent  in  1995  and  then 
again  to  8.8  per  cent  in  1997  (Economist,  December  6,  1997). 
If  the  trend  toward  financial  liquidity  continues,  and  particularly  if  it  gains  a 
major  boost  from  changes  in  the  pension  system,  German  financial  enterprises  may 
well  find  willing  allies  in  the  country’s  corporate  managers  attracted  by  the 
possibilities  to  enrich  themselves  through  living  off  the  past  rather  than  the 
challenges  of  the  difficult  organisational  transformations  that  are  necessary  to 
recreate  the  foundations  for  sustained  innovation.  Far  from  being  vilified  for  such 
behaviour  they  may  well  find  themselves  praised  for  their  initiative  in  breaking 
through  “distributional  coalitions”  and  “social  rigidities”  which,  at  least  in  the 
conservative  mind,  are  the  root  of  Germany’s  current  economic  problems.8  Indeed, 
now  that  it has  become  clear  that  a transformation  of some  description  is  required  in 
the  productive  sphere  “tough”  strategies  such  as  downsizing  which  are,  at  least  in 
isolation,  adaptive  strategies,  have  already  attracted  strong  support  in  certain 
quarters  of  German  society.  Similarly,  the  awarding  of  stock  options  to  senior 
executives,  and  other  moves  that  associate  the  success  of major  companies  with  the 
actions  of a handful  of  administrators,  or the  perception  of such,  have  been  heralded 
by  those  who  claim  that  Germany’s  lack  of  innovative  success  vis-a-vis  the  United 
States  as  rooted  in a relative  absence  of entrepreneurial  initiative. 
A  striking  example  of  a  senior  German  manager  who  has  in  recent  years 
marketed  himself  as  an  exemplar  of  a  new  breed  of  tough  and  entrepreneurial 
German  executives  is  the  chairman  of  Daimler-Benz,  Jurgen  Schremmp.  Until 
recently,  Daimler-Benz  was  pursuing  a  grand  strategy  to  become  an  integrated 
technology  concern  under  the  leadership  of  its  previous  chairman,  Edzard  Reuter, 
and  with  the  support  of  Deutsche  Bank,  the  company’s  leading  shareholder.  In  1995 
Reuter  was  replaced  by  Schremmp  following  the  announcement  of an  enormous  loss 
of  DM  5.7  billion,  the  largest  sustained  by  a German  company  in the  postwar  period. 
Schremmp’s  stated  objective  as  chairman  is  to  transform  the  company  to  make 
shareholder  interests  the  number  one  priority.  Among  the  changes  that  have  been 
justified  as  “maximising  shareholder  value”  was  the  transfer  of work  valued  at  DM  1 
billion  to  suppliers  in Asia  to eliminate  8,800  jobs  at  Daimler-Benz  Aerospace  (Dasa), 
the  dismantlement  of  the  loss-making  AEG  industrial  goods  subsidiary,  and  the 
withdrawal  of  financial  support  for  Fokker,  Daimler’s  Dutch  aircraft  subsidiary 
(Financial  Times,  April  11,  1996,  p.  11;  Economist,  March  16,  1996). 
In  April  1996  the  company  announced  the  introduction  of  a  share  option 
incentive  scheme  for  170  of  its  senior  executives  to  ensure  that  their  personal 
financial  interests  coincide  with  those  of  its  shareholders  (Financial  Times,  April  2, 
1996;  Ibid.,  April  24,  1996).  The  company’s  works  councils  apparently  supported  the 
plan  but  the  employee  representatives  on  the  supervisory  board,  with  one  exception, 
objected  to  it.  In  explanation  for  their  stance,  one  member  of  the  board,  Bernhard 
Wurl,  a  senior  official  of  IG  Metall,  said  that  they  were  afraid  that  the  company’s 
share  price  would  assume  overriding  significance  if the  executives  had  options  and 
that  job  losses  would  be  increased  in  attempts  to  get  profits  up.  But  the  plan  brought 
a The  concepts  of distribution  coalitions  and  social  rigidities  are  developed  in  Olson,  1982.  For 
a  critique  of  Olson’s  argument  as  applied  to  the  FRG  after  the  war,  see  Giersch  et  al,  1992, 
pp.  73-75. 
40 kudos  from  the  Anglo-American  business  press  as  exemplified  by  an  article  in  the 
Financial  Times: 
.  .  . the  case  for  seeking  to  establish  a  closer  alignment  between  the  interests  of  owners  and 
management  is  not  difficult  to  make  here.  One  of  the  disadvantages  of  a  bank-dominated 
corporate  system  is  that  banks  may  have  a  greater  interest  in  promoting  size  rather  than 
profitability.  It  is certainly  striking  that  Deutsche  Bank,  the  biggest  shareholder  in  Daimler- 
Benz,  was  intimately  involved  in  the  disastrous  conglomerate  strategy  pursued  by  Mr 
Schrempp’s  predecessor,  Mr  Edzard  Reuter  (Financial  Times,  April  9,  1996). 
The  statement  omits  to  mention  that  not  only  was  Deutsche  Bank  a supporter 
of  Daimler’s  “disastrous  conglomerate  strategy”,  so  too  was  Jtirgen  Schrempp!  Nor 
does  it  recognise  that  the  incentives  of  Deutsche  Bank  and  other  financial 
enterprises  in  Germany  have  changed  considerably  in  recent  decades.  They  have 
now  much  greater  interests  in  rediscovering  “the  interests  of  owners”  and  better 
aligning  their  interests  with  shareholders  by  making  themselves  owners  than  ever 
before.  Indeed,  the  Deutsche  Bank  had  pipped  Daimler-Benz  to  the  post  by  a week 
when  it  announced  the  first  large-scale  executive  share-option  scheme  in  the 
German  corporate  economy  (Financial  Times,  April  24,  1996).’ 
It  is  too  early  to  identify  the  significance  for  the  company’s  strategy  and 
performance  of  the  new  managerial  rhetoric  at  Daimler-Benz.  Moreover,  the 
experience  of  Daimler-Benz  under  Schremmp  is just  one  case.  Many  Germans,  and 
Continental  Europeans  in general,  are  sanguine  about  the  possibilities  of these  types 
of  behaviour  taking  hold  among  German  managers.  Nevertheless  it  is  dangerous  to 
dismiss  it  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  an  unfinished  and  isolated  story.  Any  evidence  of 
a  shift  in  the  outlook  of  German  managers,  and  in  particular  of  their  commitment  to 
strategies  that  build  innovative  organisations,  must  of  necessity  be  anecdotal.  To  the 
extent  that  a significant  change  is  underway,  it is in its formative  stages. 
One  of  the  most  important  lessons  that  the  history  of  American  corporate 
governance  teaches  us,  is that  in the  face  of  unprecedented  productive  and  financial 
challenges,  “organisation  men”  can  be  trained  to  be  ardent  proponents  of 
shareholder  value  or  any  other  mantra  that  justifies  them  lining  their  pockets.  In 
Germany,  as  in  Japan,  organisational  control  has,  as  yet,  proven  to  be  more  stable 
than  in  the  United  States.  In  contrast  to  their  Japanese  counterparts,  however, 
German  labour  and  German  finance  have  pursued  their  interests  through 
organisations  that  have  had  more  autonomy  from  the  strategies  and  structures  of 
industrial  enterprises.  The  biggest  risk  that  the  German  system  of  corporate 
governance  now  faces,  given  the  productive  and  financial  challenges  that  it 
confronts,  is  that  German  labour  and  finance  will  insist  on  pursuing  their  own 
independent  strategies  to  extract  returns  from  industrial  enterprises.  If  this  were  to 
happen  German  corporate  governance  would  dissipate  into  a “stakeholder  economy” 
that  undermines  the  foundations  of organisational  control. 
’  Continental,  the  tyre  company,  and  BHF-Bank  have  run  small-scale  option  schemes  for 
some time. 
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